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In 1864, the Maori Combat Order for the battle of Te Ranga in the
Bay of Plenty in New Zealand began with the following New Testament
verse: "If thine enemy hunger, feed him; if he thirst give him drink."'
This reference signals a theoretical recognition of the basic principles of
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humanitarian law. Unfortunately, however, such recognition is not
supported by an effective or fool-proof implementation and/or
enforcement mechanism.
In general terms, the implementation and/or enforcement of
international law is problematic. This is particularly true of the
implementation of international humanitarian law during armed conflicts.
Thus, the rationale for the inclusion of provisions relating to scrutiny of
the implementation of obligations and verifying compliance with the
rules applicable in armed conflicts can be described as follows: in time of
war and contrary to peace time relations (where every country is in a
status that can empower it to ensure how other countries treat its
nationals and how the international conventions are applied), the
breakdown in relations and communication between the parties to a
conflict precludes any direct verification of compliance.2 Consequently,
that party to a conflict who ascertains that its adversary is not fulfilling
its obligations has no time to identify, confirm, and verify the situation.
Thus, it will launch into protests or, what is worse, reprisals, which, more
often than not, do nothing to remedy a wrong.3
Accordingly, and in concomitance with suggestions to establish the
origins and the reasons for inclusion of provisions of scrutiny, legal (e.g.
to respect and ensure respect of the conventions), deterrent, other
humanitarian, and practical reasons 4 may explicate the necessity and/or
determination for setting into motion a procedure of enquiry into the
occurrence of a breach of the Conventions.
Nevertheless, articles relating to setting into motion a procedure of
enquiry into the occurrence of a breach of Conventions were always
burdened with heavy machinery, resulting in their mummification.
Article 90 of Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August
2. JEAN PICTET, HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE PROTECTION OF WAR 62 (Henry
Dunant ed., 1975).
3. Id.
4. For example, the need for such a procedure of enquiry occurred during the
Korean conflict. Supported by both Communist China and the former Soviet Union,
North Korea contended that the United States was using bacteriological weapons. "The
United States immediately proposed an investigation into said allegation." Communist
nations, however, rejected the proposal and responded with the establishment of their
own "Scientific Commission." As expected, the Commission verified the allegation.
"The final chapter of this incident occurred when, some years later, a book was published
in the former Soviet Union in which every instance of the use of chemical and
bacteriological warfare was set forth ... and there is no mention of the Korean incident."
Viney, Research Policy: Soviet Union, in CBW: CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
133 (Steven Rose ed., 1969); see also Howard S. Levie, Pros and Cons of the 1977
Protocol 1, 19 AKRON L. REv. 537 (1986). Moreover, the Soviet bloc opposed any
provision for an International Fact-Finding Commission that would be empowered to
investigate any allegation of violations of the Conventions and the Protocol. Id.
[Vol. 22:2
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12, 1949 ("Article 90"), is one of those mummified articles. The aim of
this essay is to analyze Article 90 and to demonstrate the practical
difficulties of its implementation. Suggestions for overcoming these
implementation difficulties, with the aim of reviving Article 90, shall be
offered.
Section 1 will trace the origins of Article 90, aiming towards
explication of preexisting understanding of the need for, but reluctance to
accept, an enquiry provision. Section 2 will focus on Article 90(1), with
specific reference to the establishment of the International Humanitarian
Fact-Finding Commission ("Commission") and the election of its
members. This shall take the form of an in depth discussion of the
conditions regarding the establishment of the Commission, the
prerequisite qualifications of its members, and other aspects pertaining to
election of members.
Section 3 will focus upon the competence of the Commission. Due
to this being a complex subject, this section is broken down into five
subsections. The first subsection investigates the optional-compulsory
competence of the Commission, with analyses of different viewpoints
regarding the competence of the Commission during the preparatory
conference. The second subsection deals with the enquiry competence of
the Commission in grave breaches and serious violations. In the third
subsection, the matter of good offices is considered. The loose and
general terms of Article 90(2)(d) is dealt with in the succeeding
subsection. The final subsection illustrates the relationship with, and the
impact of, Article 90 on the enquiry provisions of the four Geneva
Conventions.
Section 4 centers upon the Chambers of enquiry, and consists of two
subsections. The first subsection focuses on the composition of the
Chamber, while the second focuses on the conduct of the enquiry by the
Chamber.
The subsequent section sets out the reporting process of the
Commission in light of the Commission's Rules of Procedure. Two
specific aspects of the reporting process, Article 90(5)(b) and (c) will be
analyzed in detail. The sixth section discusses Article 90(6) and (7),
which comments on the Commission's own Rules of Procedure and the
issue of expenses and funding of the Commission. The concluding
section of this article outlines the issue of expenses and funding of the
Commission laid down in Article 90(7).
1. The Origins of Article 90
In searching for the origins of Article 90 of Protocol I, it is
appropriate to start two phases earlier. Setting a procedure of enquiry
2003]
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
into motion can-be traced back to the Convention for the Amelioration of
the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field
("CACWSAF of 1929"). 5 After considerable discussions, Article 306
was adopted, and "the text was only approved by the Diplomatic
Conference of 1929 after much hesitation. Many delegates were afraid
of opening a door, in the Convention, to possible sanctions against
States. '' 7 Despite difficulties in application (as the institution of inquiry
will be decided between the interested Parties), Article 30 was still
conceived as an important advancement in international humanitarian
law. This is due to the fact that no provision of that type existed in either
the Conventions of 1864 and 1906, or in the Hague Conventions of 1899
and 1907.
At the Fifteenth International Red Cross Conference of 1934,
attention was drawn to the need to provide some type of practically
automatic procedure. 8 Consequent to both the aforementioned need, and
the problems foreseen from applying Article 30 of the CACWSAF of
1929, 9 the Commission of Experts, convened in 1937 by the International
5. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armies in the Field, July 27, 1929, 118 L.N.T.S. 303, available at http://www.icrc.org
[hereinafter CACWSAF of 1929].
6. Article 30 of the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field reads as follows:
On the request of a belligerent, an enquiry shall be instituted, in a manner to be
decided between the interested Parties, concerning any alleged violation of the
Convention; when such violation has been established the belligerents shall put
an end to and repress it as promptly as possible.
Id. However, one of the most important enhancements of the Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War "was the introduction of an effective and regular scrutiny
of its application. This was entrusted to "protecting powers," that is to say, to neutral
States representing a belligerent in dealings with that belligerent's adversary. These
States offer two vital features deriving from their very nature: neutrality and official
status." They should ensure by their intervention that, "prisoners receive protection
somewhat similar to the diplomatic protection to which foreigners are entitled in peace
time." The origins of the protecting power system could be traced back to the sixteenth
century. "At that time only larger States maintained embassies, and the smaller powers
asked them to look after their interests where they were not represented. The supervisory
function assigned protecting powers in 1929 was complemented by recognition in law of
the ICRC's activities." PICTET, supra note 2, at 62; see also MARCO SASSOLI, ET. AL.,
INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, How DOES LAW PROTECT IN WAR 228-230 (1999); see
generally, G.I.A.D. Draper, The Implementation And Enforcement of the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 and of the Two Additional Protocols of 1977, in RECUEIL DES
COURS: COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 9-31
(Sijthoff & Noordhoff eds., 1980); Erich Kussbach, Protocol I and Neutral States, 218
INT'L REV. RED CROSS 231 (1980).
7. JEAN PICTET, INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE 1sT GENEVA
CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN
ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 374 (1952).
8. Id. at 374.
9. An attempt was made to apply Article 30 of the 1929 Convention during the
[Vol. 22:2
WILL THIS MUMMIFICATION SAGA COME TO AN END?
Committee of the Red Cross ("ICRC") to contemplate the revision of the
Geneva Convention, studied the problem in detail. 10 The Commission of
Experts elucidated certain principles to be defined in a new Article. The
Sixteenth International Red Cross Conference, which met in London in
1938, adopted its conclusions with virtually no alteration. 1
Following the Second World War, the ICRC resumed work on the
revision of the Geneva Conventions. Herein, the conclusions of the
aforementioned Commission of Experts served as a basis for the
proposals put forward. Thus, at the Conference of Government Experts
held in Geneva in 1947, the ICRC made certain recommendations.12 The
Government Experts opposed the establishment of a specialized
authority, provided for in advance by the Convention, preferring that the
President of The Hague Court appoint members of the Commission of
Enquiry. Basing itself on the Government Experts' conclusions, the
ICRC submitted a text to the Seventeenth International Red Cross
Conference in Stockholm in 1948, under the title of Investigation
Procedures (Article 41).13
Italo-Abyssinian War of 1935-1936. Id. at 378.
10. Id. at 374.
11. Id. at 374-375.
12. Id. at 374-375. These recommendations were as follows:
1. That the procedure of enquiry be initiated as rapidly as possible and in a
practically automatic fashion.
2. That the enquiry may be demanded by any Party to the Convention concerned,
whether belligerent or neutral.
3. That a single, central, and permanent authority, for which provision is made in
advance in the Convention, be entrusted with the nomination of the whole or
part of the Commission of Enquiry.
4. That the Commission of Enquiry be appointed for each particular case,
immediately after the request is made, following an alleged violation of the
Convention.
5. That the members of the Commission of Enquiry be appointed by the aforesaid
authority from lists, kept up-to-date, of qualified and available persons, whose
names have been submitted beforehand by Governments.
6. That special agencies be appointed in advance to undertake, in case of need, any
immediate investigation of the facts which may appear necessary.
7. That the report of the Commission of Enquiry contain, where necessary, not
only a record of the facts established, but also recommendations to the Parties
concerned.
Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 41, 7 U.N.T.S. 31, available at
http://www.icrc.org [hereinafter First Convention].
13. The submitted text reads as follows:
Independently of the procedure foreseen in Article 9, any High Contracting
Party alleging a violation of the present Convention may demand the opening
of an official enquiry.
This enquiry shall be carried out as soon as possible by a Commission
instituted for each particular case, and comprising three neutral members
selected from a list of qualified persons drawn up by the High Contracting
2003]
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In the Diplomatic Conference of 1949, the Joint Committee (a
Committee to which all the provisions common to all four Conventions
were submitted) was entrusted to study Article 41, which was submitted
in the Stockholm Conference, where one slight alteration was made. The
Joint Committee referred the Article to its Special Committee, where it
was dealt with by the Working Party responsible for problems
concerning the settlement of disputes that might arise in connection with
the application of the Conventions.'
4
The Special Committee expressed itself as follows:
The Special Committee considered that Articles 41 and 45(2) of the
Stockholm drafts set up a procedure for recruitment which was too
complicated, and that it would be appropriate to revert once more to
the provision contained in Article 30 of the Wounded and Sick
Convention of 1929, while defining its terms more clearly.
Thus, the Special Committee proposed an Article,' 5 which was
submitted to the Joint Committee. Without discussion, the Joint
Committee and the Plenary Assembly approved this Article, as well as
the decision to include it in all of the four Conventions. However, the
1949 Diplomatic Conference did not feel that it could accept, either as a
whole, or in part, the conclusions reached by the experts consulted by the
ICRC.
16
Therefore, the adopted Articles (common Articles 52, 53, 132,
149) 17 replicated much the same wording as Article 30 of the
Parties in time of peace, each Party nominating four such persons.
The plaintiff and defendant States shall each appoint one member of the
Commission. The third member shall be designated by the other two and
should they disagree, by the President of the Court of International Justice or,
should the latter be a national of a belligerent State, by the President of the
International Committee of the Red Cross.
As soon as the enquiry is closed, the Commission shall report to the Parties
concerned on the reality and nature of the alleged facts, and may make
appropriate recommendations.
All facilities shall be extended by the High Contracting Parties to the
Commission of enquiry in the fulfillment of its duties. Its members shall enjoy
diplomatic privileges and immunities.
Id. art. 41; see PICTET, supra note 7, at 375-376.
14. PICTET, supra note 7, at 376.
15. The Article proposed by the Special Committee provides:
The initiative for the enquiry procedure belongs to either one of the belligerents
and not to all the Contracting Parties. The membership of the Commission of
enquiry was determined by agreement between the Parties and not from a
previously established list.
Id. Moreover the enquiry procedure "was not closed by a mere recommendation, but by
findings which were mandatory for the Parties." Id.
16. Id. at 377.
17. First Convention, supra note 12, art. 52; Convention (II) for the Amelioration of
[Vol. 22:2
WILL THIS MUMMIFICATION SAGA COME TO AN END?
CACWSAF of 1929. The primary difference between the two rested in
the addition of the following phrase: "If agreement has not been reached
concerning the procedure for the enquiry, the Parties should agree on the
choice of an umpire, who will decide upon the procedure to be
followed."' 8 Accordingly, the enquiry procedure embodied in the four
Geneva Conventions of 1949 was still lacking a permanent nature, and
no progress was made regarding the automatic operation of the procedure
of enquiry or the choice of those responsible for carrying it out.' 9
Surprisingly, the Draft Protocol, which was elaborated by the ICRC
and served as the basis for discussion of the Diplomatic Conference
inaugurated in 1974, did not contain any provision to improve the
enquiry procedure provided in the 1949 Conventions.20
In the Diplomatic Conference of March 19, 1975, Denmark, New
Zealand, Norway and Sweden jointly forwarded a proposal adding a new
article.2 ' This proposal, together with one offered by Pakistan,22 on the
the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea,
Aug. 12, 1949, art. 53, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, available at http://www.icrc.org [hereinafter
Second Convention]; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,
1949, art. 132, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, available at http://www.icrc.org [hereinafter Third
Convention]; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, art. 149, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Convention]. The
aforementioned Articles are similar and read as follows:
At the request of a Party to the conflict, an enquiry shall be instituted, in a
manner to be decided between the interested Parties, concerning any alleged
violation of the Convention. If agreement has not been reached concerning the
procedure for the enquiry, the Parties should agree on the choice of an umpire,
who will decide upon the procedure to be followed. Once the violation has
been established, the Parties to the conflict shall put an end to it and shall
repress it with the least possible delay.
18. First Convention, supra note 12, art. 52.
19. PICTET, supra note 7, at 377.
20. Masayuki Takemoto, The Enquiry Procedure Under International Humanitarian
Law, 1 KANSAI U. REv. L. & POL. 21 (1980).
21. The proposal forwarded jointly by Denmark, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden
reads as follows:
1. A permanent International Enquiry Commission, consisting of fifteen
members of high personal integrity, shall be established, consideration being
given to the need for representation of different areas of the world. The
International Committee of the Red Cross shall draw up the procedures for
appointment, as well as other rules relating to membership, including the
presidency of the Commission, and shall undertake the appointments but shall
in no way be responsible for the enquiries undertaken or the findings which
emerge from them.
2. (a) The function of the International Enquiry Commission is to enquire
into alleged violations of the Conventions and the present Protocol and other
rules relating to the conduct of an international armed conflict
(i) At the request of one or more Parties to the conflict;
(ii) On its own initiative.
(b) One or more Parties to a conflict may request the International
Enquiry Commission to undertake an enquiry in pursuance of Articles 52,
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53, 132 and 149 common to the Conventions and Article 74 of the present
Protocol.
(c) All enquires shall be undertaken by a Chamber, consisting of the
President and four other members of the Commission appointed by the
President in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article.
3. When the Commission undertakes an enquiry, the President shall
immediately consult with the Parties to the conflict regarding the composition
of the Chamber. If the Parties agree upon the inclusion of one or more
members in the Chamber, the President shall appoint those members. The
Parties may each request the President to refrain from appointing certain
members, but not more than four, to the Chamber
4. (a) The Chamber appointed under paragraph 3 to undertake an enquiry
shall invite the Parties to the conflict to submit evidence and argument.
Evidence may also be accepted from international organizations, governments,
non-governmental organizations and individuals.
(b) Such evidence and argument shall be fully disclosed to the Party or
Parties which shall have the right to comment on it.
(c) A Party may invite the Chamber to investigate the situation in loco.
(d) The Chamber may appoint, as experts assisting it, the qualified
persons referred to in Article 6 of the present Protocol if such persons are
made available by a High Contracting Party.
(e) The Chamber shall publicly report its findings on the facts and the law
unless Parties agree otherwise. If it is unable to secure adequate evidence
for factual and impartial findings it shall state the reasons for that inability.
5. The Commission shall adopt its rules of procedures.
6. The Commission's activities shall be financed by voluntary contributions
channeled by the International Committee of the Red Cross.
Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of
International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts (Geneva 1974-1977),
CDDH/I/SR.57 (1976) [hereinafter Offical Records].
22. The proposal forwarded by Pakistan reads as follows:
1. A permanent Commission for the enforcement of Humanitarian Law
hereinafter referred to as the Commission shall be established.
2. The Commission shall consist of five members, one from each of the five
regional groups, appointed for one year in the manner hereinafter prescribed
and one member nominated by each Party to the conflict who is not already
represented upon the Commission.
3. (i) The depository of the Protocol shall draw up and maintain five separate
regional lists of the high contracting Parties in alphabetical order.
(ii) In the month of December in every region the countries whose names
appear at the top of the regional list shall separately nominate a
representative each to be a member of the Commission.
(iii) Such members shall hold office for one calendar year on the expiry of
which they shall automatically retire.
(iv) Each country whose name appears next in a regional list shall
similarly nominate a member to fill the vacancy caused by retirement and
inform the depositary without delay, and this process shall be repeated in
the month of December every year till a list is exhausted when the country
ranking first in alphabetical order shall start the process all over again.
(v) Any vacancy arising during the course of the year shall be filled by the
country whose representative has caused it.
4. The Commission shall have a Chairman who shall hold office for one
calendar month and shall be appointed from amongst the members of the
Commission in strict alphabetical order of the countries represented upon it.
[Vol. 22:2
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2 5 1h of March 1975, were the main foundations for Article 90.
2. Establishment of the Commission and Electing its Members
One of the major innovations in Protocol I is that, for the first time
in the history of humanitarian law, States gave their consent to the
establishment of a permanent international fact-finding body. This body,
adding 'Humanitarian' to its title to avoid confusion with other fact-
finding bodies, became the International Humanitarian Fact-Finding
Commission.
Article 90(1)(a) of Protocol I reads as follows: "An International
Fact-finding Commission (hereinafter referred to as 'the Commission')
consisting of fifteen members of high moral standing and acknowledged
impartiality shall be established. 23
The Commission is comprised of fifteen members.24 The requisite
qualifications for the members of the Commission are encapsulated in
the phrases, "of high moral standing" 25  and "acknowledged
5. The Commission shall on being moved by a Party to the conflict or a
Protecting Power:
(a) Enquire into any alleged violations of the Conventions and the present
Protocol and other rules relating to the conduct of an international armed
conflict.
(b) Take appropriate steps for the resolution of any disagreement amongst
the Parties to the conflict regarding the interpretation or application of the
Conventions and the Protocol where the conciliation procedure provided
therein has failed.
(c) Endeavour to bring back to an attitude of respect for and obedience to
the provisions of the Conventions and this Protocol, a Party which fails to
fulfil its obligations thereunder.
Official Records, supra note 21.
23. Protocol Addition to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S.
3 [hereinafter "Protocol I].
24. The Commission is composed of fifteen members (like the International Court of
Justice [hereinafter ICJ]), while the Human Rights Committee consists of eighteen
members, as provided in Article 28 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter
ICCPR]. The idea of a fifteen member Commission was embodied in the proposal
forwarded by Denmark, New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden. The proposal forwarded by
Pakistan calls for a Commission consisting of five members. The formation of the
Commission of fifteen members is more concordant with the competence of the
Commission and is more practical: It can be anticipated that more than one conflict could
surface at the same time and may require the obtrusion of the Commission. This holds
true if paragraph 1 (a) is read in tandem with paragraph 3(a)(i); the latter addresses the
appointment of the Chamber that undertakes enquiries, which consists of 7 members (5
members of the Commission and 2 ad hoc members). This can afford to the Commission
to enquire into three different conflicts at the same time.
25. This condition is enshrined in some international and regional human rights
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impartiality., 26 Both conditions are evidently indispensable to pledge
credibility and effectiveness of the Commission. As pertaining to the
condition of the "acknowledged impartiality" of the members of the
Commission, the following question should be posited: Does a
member's holding of certain offices contemporaneously in his or her own
country conflict with this condition?
Rule 3 of the Rules of Procedure of the International Humanitarian
Fact-Finding Commission ("Rules of the IHFFC")2 7 provides that
members shall not engage in any occupation that may shed a legitimate
doubt on their morality and impartiality. Moreover, it provides that in
case of doubt, the Commission shall decide on the proper measures to
take. Accordingly, the condition of "acknowledged impartiality" may
prevent the election of persons who, in their own countries, are actively
holding certain offices. On the other hand, not all persons holding
offices in their own countries have to be regarded as disqualified.
Similarly, a person who is known for his uncompromising public
position with regard to states that are or could be involved in an armed
conflict, would not be eligible.28
Moreover, Rule 3 of the Rules of the IHFFC provides that,
"Members shall not... make any public Statement that may cast a
legitimate doubt ... ." This rule indicates that members of the
Commission, once elected, should abstain from making any public
comment on current armed conflicts. 29 The requirements that members
remain independent and make a solemn declaration, which are embedded
in Rule 1 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission, serve to
reinforce the aforementioned requirements and obligations.30
conventions with regard to supervisory bodies (e.g. ICCPR supra note 24, art. 28, and
Article 34 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S. Treaty
Series No. 36, at 1, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, (entered into force July 18, 1978) [hereinafter
ACHR]).
26. With regard to the supervisory set up under some of the human rights
conventions, this condition is also embodied in some of them (e.g. Article 8 of the
International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, 660
U.N.T.S. 195, (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969)) [hereinafter CEFRD].
27. Under the title of Incompatibilities, Rule 3 of the Rules of the IHFFC reads as
follows:
During their term of office, Members shall not engage in any occupation or
make any public statement that may cast a legitimate doubt on their morality
and impartiality required by the Protocol. In case of doubt the Commission
shall decide on the proper measures to take.
Rules of the International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission, July 8, 1992,
available at http://www.ihffc.org [hereinafter Rules of the IHFFC].
28. YVES SANDOZ, ET. AL., COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE
1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, 1041 (1987).
29. Id. at 1041.
30. Under the title of Independence and Solemn Declaration, Rule I reads as
[Vol. 22:2
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Furthermore, Article 90(1)(d) and Rule 5(1) of the Rules of the
IHFFC obligate the High Contracting Parties at the elections to ensure
that the elected members (individually) posses the requisite
qualifications.31
However, under a literal reading, Article 90(1)(a) implies that no
professional qualifications are required or should be pursued in
nominating or electing the members of the Commission. Nevertheless,
given the nature and competence of the Commission, (to enquire into any
facts alleged to be a grave breach or other serious violation) it is
axiomatic that other qualifications ought to be considered in the
nomination and election of members. Some of them must be experts, or
experienced, in humanitarian law, and others must be experienced in
areas (e.g. investigation experts, military experts, etc., if such persons are
not elected they shall assist the Commission as externals) that enable the
Commission to function appropriately and effectively. However, during
the preparatory work discussions, it was suggested that the task of
inquiry would be entrusted to a group of experts. This group should be
"acquainted with and have interdisciplinary experience of, the various
aspects of enforcement of the Geneva Conventions and the Protocols. 32
follows:
1. In the performance of their functions, the Members of the Commission
(hereinafter referred to as the 'Members') shall accept no instructions from any
authority or person whatsoever and serve in their personal capacity.
2. Before taking up his duties, each Member shall make the following solemn
declaration: "I will exercise my functions as a Member of this Commission
impartially, conscientiously and in accordance with the provisions of the
Protocol and these Rules, including those concerning secrecy."
Rules of the IHFFC, supra note 27, Rule 1. In this context, it is worthwhile to note that
the members of the Human Rights Committee take an oath or make a solemn declaration,
partly inspired by the one taken by the judges of the International Court of Justice, to
perform their duties and exercise their powers honorably, faithfully, impartially, and
conscientiously. See M. Schreiber, La Pratique Des Nations Unies Dans Le Domaine De
La Protection Des Droits De L 'homme, 145 HAGUE RECUEIL 334 (1975).
31. Additionally, Rule 5(1) of the Rules of the IHFFC provides that: "[t]he
Commission shall ensure that each candidate possesses the qualifications required by
article 90 of the Protocol and that, in the Commission as a whole, equitable geographical
representation is maintained." Rules of the IHFFC, supra note 27, Rule 3.
32. Official Records, supra note 21. In the Belgrade Minimum Rules of Procedure
for International Human Rights Fact-Finding Missions, these rules are intended to curb
serious abuses and departures from fundamental norms of due process, which were found
by a research committee. This committee was composed of members from Britain,
Austria, Singapore, Kenya, Uruguay, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Ghana, the Netherlands, and the
U.S. It studied this matter for four years. The 59t Conference of the International Law
Association, held in Belgrade from August 8 to 23, 1980, approved by consensus a set of
minimal procedures to protect the integrity of human rights fact-finding by non-
governmental organizations. These norms, designated the Belgrade Rules, are intended
to encourage States to cooperate with fact-finding missions and to contribute to the
credibility of the facts found. Although the International Law Association is a non-
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The Commission is independent from the States that established it.
Thus, following elections, the members of the Commission are required
to serve as individuals in their personal capacity. In other words, they
are not acting as representatives of any government or international
organization but as individuals accountable for themselves.33 This
condition, incarnating the complete impartiality of the members, is
enshrined in Article 90(1)(c). 34 Moreover, Rule 1 of the Rules of the
Commission places additional emphasis upon this condition.35
Article 90(1)(b) of Protocol I reads as follows:
When not less than twenty High Contracting Parties have agreed to
accept the competence of the Commission pursuant to paragraph 2,
the depositary shall then, and at intervals of five years thereafter,
convene a meeting of representatives of those High Contracting
Parties for the purpose of electing the members of the Commission.
At the meeting, the representatives shall elect the members of the
Commission by secret ballot from a list of persons to which each of
those High Contracting Parties may nominate one person.
36
This paragraph outlines the acceptance of twenty parties37 to the
governmental forum, its formulations of international law carry considerable weight
because of the expertise of the members and the organization's broad geographical
coverage.
Rule 4 of the IHFFC reads as follows: "The fact finding mission should be
composed of persons who are respected for their integrity, impartiality, competence and
objectivity .. " Rules of the IHFFC, supra note 27, Rule 4 (emphasis added); see
Thomas M. Franck, The Belgrade Minimal Rules of Procedure for International Human
Rights Fact-Finding Missions, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 163 (1981).
The condition of the members' competence in the field related to the competence of
the body they are elected for is embodied in Article 28(2) of the ICCPR, which lays down
the qualifications of the members to be elected; it provides as follows: "The Committee
shall be composed of... who shall be persons of high moral character and recognized
competence in the field of human rights .. " ICCPR, supra note 24, art. 28(2).
33. Erich Kussbach, The International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission, 43
INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 174, 175 (1994).
34. Article 90(1)(c) reads as follows: "The members of the Commission shall serve
in their personal capacity and shall hold office until the election of new members at the
ensuing meeting." Protocol I, supra note 23, art. 90(l)(c).
35. Rule 1 of the Rules of the IHFFC provides as follows:
1. In the performance of their functions, the Members of the Commission
(hereinafter referred to as the "Members") shall accept no instructions from any
authority or person whatsoever and serve in their personal capacity.
2. Before taking up his duties, each Member shall make the following solemn
declaration: "I will exercise my functions as a Member of this Commission
impartially, conscientiously and in accordance with the provisions of the
Protocol and these Rules, including those concerning secrecy."
Rules of the IHFFC, supra note 27, Rule 1.
36. ICCPR, supra note 24, art. 90(1)(b).
37. As may be observed, this condition was not embodied in either the proposal
forwarded by the Scandinavian countries and New Zealand or in that forwarded by
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Protocol to Competence of the Commission,38 as the underlying
condition for the establishment of the Commission. (This condition is
linked to the mandatory competence of the Commission in paragraph
2(a), which will be discussed later). Once this condition is satisfied, the
obligation to establish the Commission is not tied to the existence of an
armed conflict. However, the purpose of the inclusion of this condition
seems to serve no purpose and may further be regarded as an impediment
to the immediate set up of the Commission. Accordingly, it took more
than thirteen years to achieve this number.39 Such a time frame signifies
that the acceptance of the Commission's competence was an uneasy and
uneven release to the parties. This reflects the apprehension and
opposition of the States toward an international fact-finding body that is
Pakistan. In Committee I, paragraph 1(b), adopted by an overwhelming majority, stated
that the meeting for election of members of the Commission was to be convened when
Article 90 had become applicable among not less than twenty High Contracting Parties.
However, paragraph 2(d), adopted at the same time by the Committee, stated that the
provisions of Article 90 should come into force when twenty States Parties to the
Protocol made declarations under paragraph 2. A contradiction exists between these
two paragraphs. See Takemoto, supra note 20, at 36.
Accordingly, a proposal was forwarded by the United States of America to the
plenary meeting:
"When not less than twenty High Contracting Parties have agreed to accept the
jurisdiction of the Commission pursuant to paragraph 2, the depositary shall
then, and at intervals of five years thereafter, convene a meeting of
representatives of those High Contracting Parties .... The United States
delegate added that, the word "jurisdiction" in the second line of his
delegation's amendment should be replaced by the word "competence." This
amendment was adopted by 49 votes to 2, with 34 abstentions. However, Mr.
Bindschedler, the head of the delegates of Switzerland, stated while explaining
his delegation's vote (and he was absolutely right), "the adoption of the
amendment proposed by the United States would have the effect, in practice, of
preventing the Fact-Finding Commission from being set up for another twenty
years.
See Official Records, supra note 21.
38. Although circumstances have not evolved as follows, the following question
might be raised: What would happen if two countries, involved in armed conflict with
one another, accepted the competence of the Commission before reaching the twenty
acceptances that ignite the establishment of the Commission? Could one of those two
countries or even the two countries ask for the establishment of the Commission
disregarding the twenty acceptances condition (which is a formal condition) in order to
benefit from their acceptance? This bulleted question had not been raised in the
preparatory work during the 1974-1977 Diplomatic Conference, but a literal reading of
Article 90 suggests that the drafters' intention was to confine the triggering of
Commission establishment only after its competence is accepted by twenty of the
Contracting Parties. This holds true in view of the fact that, in order for the Commission
to be established, not less than twenty Contacting Parties must accept its competence with
a separate declaration.
39. On the 2 0th of November 1990, Canada was the twentieth state to accept the
competence of the Commission. Today, 65 parties have accepted the competence of the
Commission. Mali was last to accept the Commission on the 6 th of May 2003.
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empowered to investigate grave breaches and serious violations. This
apprehension and opposition is founded on the ground that this would be
a violation of their sovereignty. On the other hand, such a time frame
implies that the Commission can play an effective role in deterring States
from violating international humanitarian law.
After meeting the formal conditions for establishing the
Commission, the Swiss Government, as the depositary power of the
Protocol, convened a meeting of the representatives of the countries that
had accepted the competence of the Commission. This meeting was
convened in Berne on the 2 5 th of June 1991, for electing the members of
the Commission. The wording of Article 90(1)(b) denotes that the
meeting of the representatives of the countries that had accepted the
Commission's competence is "strictly limited in purpose to electing the
members of the Commission. Nothing else is within the meeting's
competence. 4°  Moreover, it signifies that the depositary power is
obligated to convene the meeting of the representatives of the States that
accepted the competence of the Commission, once the formal condition
is met. Furthermore, it is obligated to convene this meeting every five
years for the purpose of electing the members.
As regards election of members, it is to be argued that the
nominated and elected members should be nationals of the countries that
accepted the competence of the Commission, according to Article
90(1)(b). This is due to the fact that the meeting for the election of the
members will be convened of the representatives of the countries that
have accepted the competence of the Commission. Thus, the nominated
and elected members will be of those countries.
If paragraph (1)(a) is read in tandem with paragraph (1)(d) ("in the
Commission as a whole, equitable geographical representation is
assured"), a counterargument arises. Namely, in order to meet this
40. J. Ashley Roach, The International Fact-Finding Commission: Article 90 of
Protocol I Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 281 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 167,
(1991).
It is worthwhile to note that the proposal submitted by the Scandinavian countries
and New Zealand presupposed that ICRC should undertake the appointment of the
members, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure drawn by itself. The ICRC
expressed its unwillingness to perform the function envisaged in that proposal. However,
the opinions on this matter were divided diversely among the delegates. Some delegates
supported the proposal of the Scandinavian countries and New Zealand. They did so
because it seemed fitting to request this of the ICRC because of its very wide experience
in the field of humanitarian activities. Moreover, this would not affect the impartiality of
the ICRC. On the other hand, several States opposed this proposal, arguing that it is
inadmissible that an international non-governmental organization, however worthy of
respect it might be, should accept the appointment and, in practice, control the action of
an international enquiry Commission engaged in supervising the activities of the States.
See Takemoto, supra note 20, at 28.
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requirement, the condition of equitable geographical representation 41
suggests that the nomination and election of the members should be from
the States Parties to the Protocol, in line with the Commission's
approach,4 z or even from the States Parties to the Protocol and the
Geneva Conventions.
However, if the condition of equitable geographical representation
is to be satisfied, it should be applied universally. In other words, it is to
be applied regardless of either the acceptance of the competence of the
Commission or the State Parties to the Protocol and the Geneva
Conventions. This argument is supported by the fact that the
Commission can be called upon to enquire into facts of a conflict whose
adversaries are not Parties either to the Protocol or to the Geneva
Conventions. Obviously, if the members of the Commission are
representing different forms of civilizations and different legal systems,
this will facilitate their task. It will further augment their effectiveness
and credibility. However, taken by itself, the condition of equitable
geographical representation suggests different applications. That is to
say, it can be applied by electing three members from each continent, or
it can be applied proportionate to the number of States in each continent.
The wording of Article 90(1)(b) stipulates that each represented
State has the right to nominate only one person. In this context, the
following question is raised: could the representatives elect more than
one national of the same country? 43 Although this did not occur, nothing
in the wording of Article 90 bans this. Thus, while the phrasing of
Article 90(1)(b) provides a specification that each representative shall
41. The requirement of equitable geographical representation is embodied in some of
the human rights conventions, regarding the bodies with supervisory functions. Article
31 of the ICCPR reads as follows:
1. The Committee may not include more than one national of the same State.
2. In the election of the Committee, consideration shall be given to equitable
geographical distribution of membership and to the representation of the
different forms of civilization and of the principal legal systems.
ICCPR, supra note 24, art. 31. However, the representation of the different forms of
civilization and of different legal systems, which is embodied in the abovementioned
article, is of vital importance. This is true because the Commission may work in different
areas of the world.
It should be noted that the requirement of the equitable geographical representation
was embodied in the two proposals forwarded by the Scandinavian countries and New
Zealand and Pakistan, although the latter embodied a strict application of the equitable
geographical representation.
42. This criterion is also followed in electing the members of the Human Rights
Committee. Article 28(2) of the ICCPR, reads as follows: "The Committee shall be
composed of nationals of States Parties to the present Covenant who .. " Id. art. 28(2).
43. In this context, it is worthwhile to note that Article 31(1) of the ICCPR forbids
the election of more than one national of the same State. It provides as follows: "The
Committee may not include more than one national of the same State." ICCPR, supra
note 24, art. 31(1).
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nominate only one person, it does not provide a condition that excludes
the election of more than one member of the same State. Moreover, the
qualifications required of the members may not be obtainable in all the
nominated persons, which is a condition that should be fulfilled.
Furthermore, the wording of Article 90(1)(a), stipulates that the
qualifications should be satisfied in the members and not in the
nominated persons.
On the other hand it should be argued that the condition of equitable
geographical representation may be affected if this happens. However,
an interpretation of Article 90 from the perspective of the context of the
terms of the treaty and the object, purpose, and intention of the parties44
suggests that the inclusion of the equitable geographical representation
condition assures a worldwide representation (geographically, culturally,
legally, etc.). This worldwide representation will definitely be affected if
we consider the number of the members of the Commission (fifteen).
Moreover, with regard to the nominated persons, the representatives of
the States are morally obliged to nominate only persons who are
qualified to be elected as members. Furthermore, one can infer that there
is a definite obligation to nominate only qualified persons. This can be
suggested if Article 90(l)(b) is read concomitantly with Article 90(l)(a).
However, the second suggestion appears to be more concordant
with the conduct of the representatives of the States in their meetings for
44. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
39/26, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
Article 31 of the above cited Convention reads as follows:
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of
its object and purpose;
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise,
in
a) addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes; any agreement
relating to the treaty which was made between all the Parties in connection
with the conclusion of the treaty.
b) any instrument which was made by one or more Parties in connection
with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other Parties as an
instrument related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
a) any subsequent agreement between the Parties regarding the
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which
establishes the agreement of the Parties regarding its interpretation;
c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations
between the Parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the Parties
so intended.
Id. art. 31. For a thorough discussion on the law of treaties, see generally, LORD
MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES (1986); see also ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW
AND PRACTICE (2000).
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the election of the members. Their practice indicates nothing that would
contradict this suggestion.
Although article 90(1)(b) provides that the election of the members
shall be made by secret ballot from those nominated persons, it does not
offer a quorum to conduct the elections. It was suggested by the Swiss
representative at the Round Table to follow the rules set out in the 1966
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights for the election of the Human
Rights Commission. 4  Surprisingly, the Rules of Procedure of the
Commission have not addressed this issue. However, on the event of
every meeting for the elections, an election procedure is proposed. The
representatives usually agree to it.46  Finally, it should be noted that,
nothing in Article 90 hinders the re-election of the members if they are
re-nominated.47
Paragraph l(e) addresses the case of casual vacancy. It states that
the "Commission proceeds by co-option, based on the original list of
candidates presented at the constitutive meeting or the last meeting or the
45. Roach, supra note 40, at 172. Article 30(4) of the ICCPR requires a quorum of
two-thirds to conduct the election of the members of the Human Rights Commission, as it
provides as follows:
Elections of the members of the Committee shall be held at a meeting of the
States Parties to the present Covenant convened by the Secretary-General of the
United Nations at the Headquarters of the United Nations. At that meeting, for
which two thirds of the States Parties to the present Covenant shall constitute a
quorum, the persons elected to the Committee shall be those nominees who
obtain the largest number of votes and an absolute majority of the votes of the
representatives of States Parties present and voting.
ICCPR, supra note 24, art. 30(4). However, the rules of the IHFFC provide no quorum
to conduct the election of the members in the meeting of the representatives.
46. In the Meeting for the Election of the Members of the International
Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission, held on November 9, 2001 in Bern, the
distributed proposal for conducting the elections, agreed to by the representatives, was as
follows:
Election Procedure:
The fifteen candidates obtaining the highest number as well as the absolute
majority of the votes cast by the representatives of the High Contracting Parties
present and voting shall be elected. Inasmuch as the first ballot proves
inconclusive additional ballots will be held until all fifteen seats have been
filled. No absolute majority of the votes will be required after the third ballot.
The representatives of the High Contracting Parties may cast a maximum of 15
votes and not more than one vote per candidate. The representatives entitled to
participate in the election proceed to cast their votes on the ballot-paper
distributed by the chairman and containing the names of the candidates and of
the nominating countries.
Distributed Proposal for the Election of Members (on file with the author).
47. The members of the Human Rights Committee are elected for a term of four
years, and they can also be reelected. These rules are provided in Article 32 of the
ICCPR, which reads as follows: "1. The members of the Committee shall be elected for a
term of four years. They shall be eligible for re-election if renominated. However,...."
ICCPR, supra note 24, art. 32.
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last meeting convened for an election."4 8 At this stage, one can relate the
condition of equitable geographical representation to the case of filling
casual. vacancies. That is to say, if a candidate from the same region to
which the former member belonged is available, he should have
precedence even over candidates from other regions who received more
votes at the election.49 Rule 5 of the Rules of the IHFFC discusses the
case of filling casual vacancies in greater detail.50 However, it makes no
reference to the condition of equitable geographical representation.
The last sub-paragraph (f) in Article 90(1) focuses upon
administrative facilities for the Commission, which would enable it to
accomplish its functions. These facilities should be available by the
depositary. However, this clause "seems to cover only availability of the
necessary locations and secretarial facilities, independently of the
expenses provided for under paragraph 7.I
3. The Competence of the Commission:
After outlining the specific scope within which the Commission was
established, explicating the procedures for the election of members and
their requisite qualifications, and underscoring the Rules of Procedure of
the IHFFC that coordinate the aforementioned themes, we will now
discuss the competence of the Commission.
48. SANDOZ, supra note 28, at 1043.
49. MICHAEL BOTHE, ET. AL., NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS:
COMMENTARY ON THE Two PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF
1949, at 543 (1982).
50. Rule 5(2) and (3), under the title of the filling of casual vacancies, provides as
follows:
2. In the absence of a consensus among the Members, the following provisions
shall apply:
a. When no candidate obtains in the first ballot the majority required, a
second ballot, restricted to the two candidates who obtained the highest
number of votes, shall be taken.
b. If the second ballot is inconclusive and a majority vote of Members
present is required, a third ballot shall be taken in which votes may be cast
for any eligible candidate. If the third ballot is inconclusive, the next
ballot shall be restricted to the two candidates who obtained the highest
number of votes in the third ballot and so on, with unrestricted and
restricted ballots alternating, until a Member is elected.
c. The elections referred to in this Rule shall be held by secret ballot.
Election shall be by a majority of the Members present.
3. A Member elected under this Rule shall serve for the remainder of the term
of his predecessor.
Rules of the IHFFC, supra note 27, Rule 5.
51. SANDOZ, supra note 28 at 1043.
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A. Optional-Compulsory Competence
The mandatory competence of the Commission is an optional clause
embraced in Article 90(2)(a), which reads as follows:
The High Contracting Parties may at the time of signing, ratifying or
acceding to the Protocol, or at any other subsequent time, declare that
they recognize ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation
to any other High Contracting Party accepting the same obligation,
the competence of the Commission to inquire into allegations by such
other Party, as authorized by this Article .... 52
Although this clause provides a compulsory competence to the
Commission, it signifies a notable retrograde step from the principal
objectives envisaged in the two proposals constituting the main
foundations for Article 90. This holds true, insofar that the
aforementioned proposals targeted instigation of an investigation solely
at the request of one party to a conflict, which was a crucial issue during
the discussions. The present formulation originated from an amendment
by the German Democratic Republic. 53  On the one hand, this
amendment can be considered the life jacket that saved a provision for
creating a permanent enquiry Commission from drowning in a choppy
sea of wide oppositions. As such, it established a compromise between
two positions that created a serious rift between the participants of the
Conference. One side of the participants insisted on a system of
compulsory enquiry, while the other was irreversibly opposed to what
they regarded as an intolerable encroachment on the sovereignty of
States. 54 On the other hand, the amendment is clear insofar as it sought
to place boundaries around opportunities of .an enquiry by the
Commission, and not vice-versa. This hold true, considering that, from
the start, the German Democratic Republic was one of the States that had
strongly opposed establishing an enquiry Commission."
52. This optional clause corresponds to the clause embodied in Article 36(2) of the
Statute of the ICJ and it is crystal clear that it is borrowed from it. Article 36(2) of the
ICJ statute provides as follows: "The States Parties to the present Statute may at any time
declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in
relation to any other State accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in
all legal disputes concerning .. " Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26,
1945, art. 36(2), 59 Stat. 1031 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
53. The amendment of the German Democratic Republic reads as follows: "The
High Contracting Parties may at any time declare that they recognize ipso facto and
without special agreement, in relation to any other State accepting the same obligations,
the competence of the Commission to ..
54. SANDOZ, supra note 28, at 1044.
55. During the preparatory work, the delegations were divided into two groups. One
group of delegations was persistently opposed to establishing a new enquiry provision.
This group included Socialist States and the States of Eastern Europe. Their main
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arguments against inclusion of a new enquiry provision can be summarized in the
following points:
1. Setting up a supranational control body was contrary to international law in as
much as it was likely to lead to interference in the internal affairs of the
countries concerned and that amounted to derogation from the sovereignty of
the States. Official Records, supra note 21, CDDH/I/SR.57 §§ 2, 62 (regarding
the Byelorussian Soviet Republic and the Ukranian Soviet Socialist Republic).
2. Establishing a permanent international enquiry Commission went further than
the Conference's diplomatic powers, for such a Commission deviated from the
spirit and meaning of the Geneva Conventions. Id. CDDH/ISR.57 §§ 1, 2
(regarding argument by the Ukranian Soviet Socialist Republic); id.
CDDH/I/SR.58 §§ 33, 34 (regarding Poland's argument).
3. The Conference of Government Experts on the Reaffirmation and Development
of International Humanitarian Law applicable in Armed Conflicts, which was
held in 1971 and 1972, together with the working if the ICRC on the provisions
of draft Protocol I for some years, both included a provision for an international
enquiry Commission. Id. CDDH/I/SR.57 § 75 (regarding India).
4. The Convention already includes a number of provisions establishing the system
of protecting powers, and providing for enquiry and conciliation procedures
which had been functioning effectively for the past quarter century. Moreover,
the enquiry procedure provided by the Geneva Conventions was based on an
excellent principle, which was that the Parties to the conflict should agree on
the need for an enquiry. Thus there was no need to establish a new body. Id.
CDDH/I/SR.57 §§ 3, 35 (regarding Soviet Socialist Republic and Hungary).
5. In view of the present international situation, it would be best to allow the United
Nations Security Council to enquire into breaches of the Conventions, and it
would be premature to institutionalize an enquiry procedure binding all States
since many of them were not prepared to accept it. It was also pointed out that
it was undesirable to contribute to proliferation of international bodies. Id.
CDDH/IISR.57 § 41 (regarding German Democratic Republic); id.
CDDH/I/SR.58 § 3 (regarding Hungary).
Meanwhile, the other groups were the delegations of Western Europe, Arabs, and some
of the Third World countries. They supported the establishment of a permanent enquiry
body and refuted the abovementioned arguments. Their counter arguments can be
summarized in the following points.
1. Setting up a permanent enquiry body was a first step toward the creation of a
body able to ensure the enforcement of the international humanitarian law.
Moreover, that new provision was the cornerstone of the entire system of
humanitarian law which the Conference was endeavoring to create. Official
Records, supra note 21, CDDH/I/SR.56 §§ 44, 71 (regarding Kuwait and
Switzerland); id. CDDH/I!SR.57 § 10 (regarding Israel).
2. The proposals to establish a permanent enquiry Commission were by no means
beyond the mandate entrusted to the Diplomatic Conference because it was
called upon, not just to state the rules, but also to find proper methods of
applying them. Id. CDDH/I/SR.58 § 39 (regarding New Zealand).
3. The provision concerning the enquiry procedure common to the 1949
Conventions had never been put into practice; although it stipulated that in the
event of a violation of the Convention, an enquiry should be held if one of the
Parties to the conflict so required, it lost much of its force because it was left to
the interested Parties to decide between themselves the manner of such an
enquiry. Id. CDDH/I/SR.57 § 11 (regarding Sweden).
4. Regarding the danger of infringing the national sovereignty or interfering in a
State's internal affairs, the concept of national sovereignty was constantly
evolving, and in practice, an increasing number of States were ready to accept
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Pursuant to the wordings of Article 90(2)(a), the word "may" offers
an elective clause. This clause is made for a Party to declare its
acceptance, ipso facto and without any special agreement, of the
competence of the Commission in advance, on a reciprocal basis with
other Parties that do likewise. The obligation to accept the competence
is established by a declaration,56 made at the time of signing, ratifying, or
acceding to the protocol,57 or at any other time.
If Article 90(2)(a) is read concurrently with Article 90(2)(d), which
states that: "In other situations, the Commission shall institute an
enquiry at the request of a Party to the conflict only with the consent of
the other Party or Parties concerned," this question arises: should such
consent be deemed to have been obtained in advance when the Party that
is the subject of these allegations is one of those that recognized the
Commission's competence a priori (sub-paragraph (a) above).58
According to the ICRC commentary on the Protocol, this interpretation
would "undeniably introduce an element of inequality: The Parties to the
conflict which have not recognized the compulsory competence of the
Commission could force a Party which has recognized this competence
methods of peaceful settlement by a third Party. Therefore, it was difficult to
see how the formation of any such enquiry body could be regarded as an
infringement of national sovereignty or as unwarranted interference in the
internal affairs of States. Id. CDDH/I/SR.58 §§27, 40 (regarding New Zealand
and Greece).
56. The Federal Department of Foreign Affairs of the Swiss Confederation, in its
capacity as the depositary State of the Geneva Conventions and their Additional
Protocols, drafted a text to serve as a model for declarations of recognition of the
competence of the IHFFC. The text reads as follows:
[The Government of...] declares that it recognizes ipso facto and without
special agreement, in relation to any other High Contracting Party accepting the
same obligation, the competence of the International Fact-Finding Commission
to enquire into allegations by such other Party, as authorized by Article 90 of
Protocol I additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949."
See 297 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 526 (1993).
57. It is worthwhile to note that the difference between signature, ratification, and
accession are stipulated in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in Articles 12,
14 and 15 respectively. However, during codification of the law of treaties at the
International Law Commission, sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, the third Special Rapporteur on
that topic, insisted that, "Strictly, accession implies, and should be only made to, a treaty
already in force. It is essentially a method ofjoining a going concern so to speak and this
results from the fact that accession is essentially the acceptance of something already
done, not a participation in the doing of it." See 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMMISSION 125, § 83
(1956). This constituted the fundamental difference between accession and signature.
See also Masayuki Takemoto, The 1977 Additional Protocols and the Law of Treaties, in
STUDIES AND ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND RED CROSS
PRINCIPLES IN HONOUR OF JEAN PICTET (Christophe Swinarski ed., 1984). See generally
P.K. MENON, THE LAW OF TREATIES BETWEEN STATES AND INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS (1992).
58. SANDOZ, supra note 28, at 1046.
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to accept the enquiry, but not the other way around.,
59
As regards the ICRC commentary argument, however, running
counter to this argument may be deemed necessary for activating the
Commission. Additionally, the ICRC commentary argument can
counteract the specificities and the norms of the humanitarian law. This
can be examined through a hypothetical situation, wherein State X does
not and is not willing to recognize the competence of the Commission.
State Y, however, recognizes the competence of the Commission. State
X alleges that State Y has committed grave breaches or serious violations
that fall within the competence of the Commission. State X asks the
Commission to investigate its allegation resting on its consent and not on
the recognition. The expected supporting argument to be advanced by
State X is that according to Article 90(2)(d), the Commission shall
inaugurate an enquiry at the request of a Party to the conflict. This
inauguration is conditioned with the consent of the other Party.
Accordingly, the acceptance of State Y of the compulsory competence in
advance should be considered as consent. This is because State Y waived
its right to oppose enquiring by the Commission, by declaring that it
recognizes its compulsory competence. This can imply that no further
manifestation of consent is needed for the Commission's competence to
be established. On the other hand, State Y might counter argue, leaning
on the literal reading of Article 90(2)(a), which signifies that there should
be a reciprocal recognition to institute an enquiry. Moreover, State Y can
also rest on the argument of the ICRC commentary.
Thus, there might be two trends. The first is that the Commission
might adhere to the literal reading of Article 90(2)(a) and the ICRC
commentary argument. Therefore, the Commission might request State
X to accept its compulsory competence by the declaration to be able to
set up the enquiry. The second is that the Commission can set up an
enquiry, without asking State X to accept its compulsory competence.
Accordingly, if the Commission favored the first trend, the case will be
closed, unless State X accepts the competence of the Commission.
However, if the Commission favored the second trend, this should be on
solid ground.
During the preparatory work, the main argument against
establishing a permanent fact-finding Commission was that, according to
the viewpoint of the States opposing establishment of the Commission,
"the idea of setting up supranational bodies with wide powers of
supervision of the activities of States and empowered to act against the
freely declared will of States ... [was] contrary to the universally
59. Id.
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recognized principles of international law.",60 Hence, State Y has already
accepted the compulsory competence of the Commission. In doing so, it
had freely declared its will to be bound by this competence, which is, in
its natural meaning, consent in advance. Over and above, common
Article 2 paragraph (3)61 to the Conventions can stand up for this trend.
Moreover, applying the argument of the ICRC commentary will
forever lead to obstructing the Commission from enquiring into
allegations between States that have accepted the Commission's
competence and those who have not. A contradiction may arise, insofar
as the Geneva Conventions and the Protocols "reflect a constant
endeavor to extend their application to the widest possible circle of
States and conflictual situations, and to reduce to a minimum the legal
grounds for avoiding such an application. 62 This further introduces a
discriminatory element, not otherwise accepted in humanitarian law.
Additionally, the potential enquiring by the Commission will curb
violations of the Protocol and the Conventions. This was the view of the
delegates during the preparatory work, as illustrated by the Canadian
delegate's statement that, "the very fact of its existence will serve to
warn potential violators of the implications of their act and thus also
contribute to the prevention of breaches. 63  In this sense, enquiring
could be regarded as a way of protection, possessing the absolute
character of protection. This "absolute character of protection resides
not only in that the protective provisions and obligations are called upon
to apply in all circumstances and regardless of reciprocity, but also in the
prohibition of inter se agreement with a view to waiving or lowering the
level of protection.,
64
However, through careful reading of the ICRC commentary
argument, one might deduce one particular obstacle for acceptance of the
Commission's enquiring in this situation. Namely, a state of inequality
will ensue. Thus, unless there is a mechanism to furnish equality in this
situation, instituting an enquiry according to the second trend is
60. Official Records, supra note 21, at 207.
61. Common Article 2 paragraph (3) reads as follows:
Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a Party to the present
Convention, the Powers who are Parties thereto shall remain bound by it in
their mutual relations. They shall furthermore be bound by the Convention in
relation to the said Power, if the latter accepts and applies the provisions
thereof.
First Convention, supra note 24, art. 2(3); Second Convention, supra note 26, art. 2(3);
Third Convention, supra note 26, art. 2(3); Fourth Convention, supra note 26, art. 2(3).
62. Georges Abi-Saab, The Specificities of Humanitarian Law, in STUDIES AND
ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND RED CROSS PRINCIPLES: IN HONOUR
OF JEAN PICTET 267 (Christophe Swinarski ed., 1984).
63. Official Records, supra note 21, at 364.
64. Abi-Saab, supra note 62, at 268.
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unacceptable. Moreover, realistically speaking, the procedure for inquiry
could not go into operation if a State opposed the intervention of the
Commission.
Thus, equalization is indispensable in this situation; the two parties
should have identical rights and obligations. As such, it is to be
suggested that an ad hoc proceeding and written agreement might
establish the aimed-for equality. The aforementioned agreement should
embrace rules to ascertain equality (e.g. to give the right to the
Commission to enquire into any allegations, falling with.in its
competence, between States X and Y, in the present conflict, in potential
future conflicts, etc.). However, this agreement might be easier said than
done, giving rise to a problematic situation that can only be resolved by
the support of other international organizations (e.g. United Nations or
the ICRC). This international support will be presented while the
Commission is creeping on its tip-toes, and then its credibility will speak
for itself. Moreover, the details (its aspects and conditions) of this
solution can be included in the Rules of Procedure of the Commission,
which can be approved by the States that had already accepted the
competence of the Commission.
Apparently, the above-mentioned suggestion can accomplish a
compromise between the objectives of the Geneva Conventions and
Protocols. It further reaches a compromise between the norms of
humanitarian law and Article 90(2)(a), on one hand, and between Article
90(2)(a) and Article 90(2)(d) on the other hand. Moreover, it attains the
object of resorting to the Commission by State X, without prejudicing the
rights of State Y, as it builds a balanced situation between the two States.
Furthermore, it expands the area of competence of the Commission,
which is absolutely necessary to end the mummification saga of the
Commission.
There is no doubt that only §tates are competent to submit a request
for an enquiry to the Commission, to the exclusion of private individuals,
representative bodies acting on behalf of the population, or organizations
of any nature. 65 However, which State might request an enquiry? In this
65. SANDOZ, supra note 28, at 1044. It should be noted that, in the proposal of the
three Scandinavian countries and Norway it was provided that the Commission could set
up an enquiry on its own initiative. On the other hand, the Pakistani proposal provided
that the Commission could set up an enquiry on the request of a party to the conflict or a
protecting power. The discussion in the committee focused on the initiative of the
Commission provided in the former proposal. This was widely criticized. Thus the co-
sponsors of that proposal suggested by implication their readiness to delete the words
recognizing the initiative by the Commission. However, according to the Official
Record, Mr. Ruud, the Norwegian delegate stated that:
[His] delegation could not accept the deletion of the clause stipulating that the
international inquiry Commission could institute an enquiry "on its own
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sense, and as provided in the ICRC commentary, "it is not necessarily the
Party which is the victim of the alleged violation which requests the
enquiry. Any Contracting Party in the sense of paragraph 1 (b) can do so,
provided that the request applies to another Contracting Party in the
sense of the same provision.
'
,
66
At first glance, it can be argued that this interpretation will augment
the role of the Commission. It can support its interference in critical
situations of conflict between a State that has recognized the competence
of the Commission, and an adversary that does not. According to the
commentary interpretation, in the case of a third State that is not party to
the conflict, and has recognized ipso facto the competence of the
Commission, this third State can invoke the competence of the
Commission. Apparently, common Article 1 (respect and ensure
respect) might support the commentary interpretation; moreover a literal
reading to Article 90(2)(a) might also sponsor this interpretation, since it
uses the term "High Contracting Party" and not "party to the conflict."
Meanwhile, it is to be counter argued that acceptance of this
interpretation will create a peculiar situation. This is because it provides
a State that is not a party to the conflict with the right to request an
enquiry (even without the consent of the party that did not accept the
competence of the Commission). Meanwhile, it restrains the party to the
conflict from doing so. This can be considered as an infringement on the
sovereignty of that State. Moreover, given the ICRC commentary
interpretation, it is plausible to assume that an element of inequality will
develop (which is refuted by the commentary). This could be expected if
the enquiry requested by .the third State were based upon political
reasons or friendly relations with that party to the conflict, which had
accepted the competence of the Commission. This holds true, as the
State that did not accept the competence of the Commission will not be
able to request an enquiry if it is a victim of allegations. Meanwhile, it
might be forced to accept the enquiry if it is the violator-as such
sovereignty can be infringed upon and inequality might ensue. This will
initiative".., in the opinion of his delegation, the Geneva Conventions and
Protocol I were also of great importance to the civilian population. He
therefore wondered whether it was fair that only Parties to the conflict should
be entitled to request the Commission to open an enquiry. In any case, that
right should not pertain solely to the official representatives of the Parties
concerned, but should be also allowed to the civilian population if the official
representatives of their country should neglect to make the request for one
reason or another.
Official Records, supra note 21. The proposals that the Commission be able to institute
an enquiry on its own initiative and then on the request of the civilian population were
widely opposed. See id. at 201.
66. SANDOZ, supra note 28, at 1044.
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not be because of humanitarian considerations, but for political and
friendly relations, which is indeed unacceptable in humanitarian law.
Furthermore, according to the commentary interpretation, Article
90(2)(a) provides a sole condition, namely, the requesting State merely
has to have recognized the competence of the Commission. This leads to
questions of whether or not such recognition should be restricted to
certain cases or situations, or be in conjunction with certain conditions.
Additionally, and of greater importance, are the practical obstacles that
may arise if such an enquiry is established without the consent of the
parties to the conflict and without any means of international
enforcement. Consequently, without a criterion specifically outlining
situations wherein such interpretation can be pursued, together with
requisite conditions, this can propel our departure from the interpretation
of the ICRC commentary. In fact, this is neither provided by Article 90
nor by the Rules of Procedure of the Commission.67
Interestingly, regarding the specific problems of the occupied
territories, an amendment sponsored by twenty-one States gave rise to a
heated discussion. The controversy focused on the addition of the
following sentence: "[i]n case of an occupied territory, the request of the
Party whose territory is occupied shall suffice for the institution of the
enquiry. ' '68 This amendment was rejected, having failed by a narrow
67. In part III, chapter I, which deals with the enquiry request and under the title of
lodging the request, Rule 20 of the Rules of Procedure reads as follows:
1. The request for an enquiry shall be addressed to the Secretariat.
2. It shall state the facts that, in the opinion of the requesting Party, constitute a
grave breach or a serious violation, as well as the date and the place of their
occurrence.
3. It shall list the evidence the requesting Party wishes to present in support of
its allegations.
4. It shall name the authority to which all communications concerning the
enquiry shall be addressed, as well as the most expedient means of contacting
that authority.
5. Where applicable and to the extent possible, it shall contain, in the
enclosure, the original or a certified copy of any document cited in the list of
evidence.
6. If the Commission receives a request for an enquiry under article 90(2)(d),
and the consent of the other Party or Parties concerned has not yet been
indicated, the Commission shall refer the request to that Party or those Parties
with a request that it or they indicate its or their consent.
Rules of the IHFFC, supra note 27, Rule 20.
68. Mr. Clark, the Nigerian delegate, while introducing the amendment and giving
reasons for the forwarded amendment, commented as follows:
Paragraph 2 of article 79 tArticle 90(2)] was based on political and
administrative considerations. Its object was therefore narrow and limited.
Since the adoption of Article 79 [90(2)], the sponsors of the proposed
amendment had re-examined the situation in the light of draft Protocol I as a
whole, and a number of points had become clear to them.
They took the view that, in its present form, paragraph 2(a) was incomplete
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2003] WILL THIS MUMMIFICATION SAGA COME TO AN END? 269
margin to obtain the necessary two-thirds majority.69 However, while
discussing Article 90(2)(d), Sri Lanka made another attempt for the
because it did not address itself to the specific problems of occupied territories.
The notion of sovereignty, which was synonymous with independence, was of
capital importance. To say that temporary occupation of a territory derogated
substantially from the owner's sovereignty over it was to deny the United
Nations principle that the acquisition of territory by force was illegal and
inadmissible.
Paragraph 2 of Article 79 [90(2)] was contrary to the spirit and the letter of
the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and Protocol I. If the occupying power
was permitted to refuse the intervention of the Fact-Finding Commission, it
could proceed with impunity to violate the provisions relating to the protection
of the civilian population and civilian objects in occupied territory and even
ignore the outcry of world opinion.
Now that there was no mention of reprisals in the texts adopted, it was
important that no occupying power should be given a pretext for refusing to
adhere strictly to the provisions of the Convention and the Protocol. Paragraph
2 introduced another dangerous doctrine by placing the aggressor and the
victim of his aggression on a footing of equality in law and in fact. It would, in
fact, sanction the military advantage gained by the adversary, a notion alien to
international law, the Geneva Conventions, and Protocol I. Sovereignty can be
relinquished only by the consent of the Parties concerned. Several international
organizations had, in numerous resolutions, expressed grave concern for the
fate of peoples in occupied territories and called for international action along
the lines proposed by some twenty States in amendment CDDH/415 and Add. 1
and 2 and Corr. 1. Such action led, for instance, to the setting up of the Fact-
Finding Commission on Namibia. The sponsors of the proposed amendment
were from non-aligned developing countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin
America.
See Official Records, supra note 21, at 311-312 (emphasis added).
The Yugoslavian delegate stated that the most frequent violations of human rights
occurred in occupied territories as a result of endeavours by the occupying power to
pacify occupied populations. This was also the viewpoint of the Egyptian delegate. Id.
69. The vote for this amendment was a roll-call vote requested by the Mexican
delegate, speaking on behalf of the sponsors. The vote was 54 in favor, 28 against, and
14 abstentions. However, opposition of this amendment was on the following grounds:
The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic noted that the
occupying power could not be assimilated to the aggressor, and the amendment
introduced an exception for the occupied territories. Requirements werethe same in all
cases, and rules should be the same for all. In addition, Italy noted that the Fact-Finding
Commission would in practice find it possible to carry out its mandate in occupied
territories without the agreement of the occupying power. The Canadian delegation
added that it considered itself bound by the "package deal" reached in the Committee.
The Israeli delegation felt that the text was quite inappropriate and that there had been no
chance to consider it in the Committee. The pervading mood regarding the discussions of
Article 90 was best described by the Egyptian delegate, Abi-Saab, while he was
explaining his vote: he said that he deplored the outcome of the vote on the amendment
and "found it very revealing that the great majority of third world countries had voted in
favour of it." In rejecting the amendment, the conference had discarded the only article
that provided a mandatory implementation system and, consequently, Article 79 [90]
remained theoretical and had no practical value. The vote had been a bitter lesson,
showing that when considerations of theory were done with, and it came to undertakings
of a practical nature, most states, namely the big and the powerful, wavered and shirked
their responsibility. Id. at 314-315, 320.
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addition of an oral amendment to the proposed text by the United States
delegation. Sri Lanka argued for the addition of a phrase which read that
"except in the case of a territory occupied as a result of aggression, in
which case the request of the Party whose territory is occupied will
suffice for the institution of an enquiry., 70  This amendment was
similarly defeated, having failed to obtain the requisite two-thirds
majority.
One can question whether or not the declarations to recognize the
competence of the Commission can be made with reservations.71 Will
70. Id. at 322. The vote on this amendment was taken by roll-call, at the request of
the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. The result was 54 in favor, 33 against, and 7
abstentions.
In comparing the result of the above-mentioned vote to the vote on the twenty-one
States' amendment to Article 90(2)(a), it is interesting to note that the two votes were in
the same meeting (the forty-fifth plenary meeting held on Monday, May 30, 1977). This
meeting began at 3:10 p.m. and lasted until 7:00 p.m. Moreover, some delegates who
opposed the first vote indicated that they would accept the amendment if it provided an
exception in the case of a territory occupied as the result of aggression. See German
Democratic Republic CDDH/SR.45 § 35; see also Federal Republic of Germany in
CDDH/SR.45 § 30.
It is clear that the 54 States voting in favor on both votes were the same number but
were not the same States. In the first vote, Bangladesh, Republic of Korea, Switzerland
and Zaire voted in favor. Surprisingly, in the second vote, neither Bangladesh nor Zaire
voted in favor, against, nor abstained. Switzerland voted against the amendment in the
second vote. Republic of Korea abstained from the second vote. In the first vote, 54
States voted in favor and 28 against-just two favorable votes shy of the two-thirds
requirement needed for adoption. The number of States who abstained in the first vote
decreased from the first vote to the second, fourteen to seven respectively. The following
States abstained in the first vote and voted against the amendment in the second vote:
Austria, Japan, Liechtenstein, Nicaragua, New Zealand, Socialist Republic of Viet Nam,
Holy See and Sweden. Only Kenya abstained from the first vote and voted in favor in the
second vote. The aforementioned statistics regarding the voting on two separate but
substantially similar proposals confirms Sri Lankan delegate Breckenridge's observation
that "the conference was in process of limiting the scope of humanitarian law to political
law, which would cast doubts on its moral level." See id. at 318 (details on the twenty-
one State proposal); id. at 324 (details of votes on the amendment of Sri Lanka); id. at
317 (speech of the delegate of Sri Lanka).
71. Article 2(d) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines
"reservation" as follows:
[R]eservation means a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made
by a State, when signing ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty,
whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain
provisions of the treaty in their application to that State....
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 44, art. 2(d). However, the
following definition of a reservation is also a useful one:
a "reservation" is a formal declaration by which a State, when signing,
ratifying, or acceding to a treaty, specifies as a condition of its willingness to
become a Party to the treaty certain terms which will limit the effect of the
treaty in so far as it may apply in the relations of that State with the other State
or States which may be Parties to the treaty.
Harvard Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, prepared under the auspices of
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these reservations have a reciprocal effect? Thus far, the situation has
not presented itself. However, if it does, will such a declaration be
accepted or not,72 and what will be the effect of other Parties' objections?
While the preparatory work gave no indication of whether or not the
declaration would be subject to reservation, the issue of reservations
generally arose. Thus, an article addressing the fact that some provisions
in the Protocol should not be subject to reservation was proposed. The
discussion, however, culminated in the rejection of the inclusion of such
an article (Article 85 of the ICRC draft 1973). 73 Nonetheless, it should
be noted that, Article 90 was not one of those articles that were proposed
Harvard Law School and published as a supplement to 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 657 (1935)
[hereinafter Harvard Research]; see also MCNAIR, supra note 44, at 158.
72. It is worthwhile to note that reservations unprohibited by the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, may still be objected to by other contracting States. AUST, supra
note 44, at 112.
73. This Article was included in the ICRC draft and reads as follows:
1. Each one of the Parties to the Conventions may, when signing, ratifying,
acceding to the present Protocol, formulate reservations to articles other than,
Arts. 5, 10, 20, 33, Art. 35, para. 1, first sentence, Art. 38, para. 1, first
sentence, and Arts. 41, 43, 46 and 47.
2. Each reservation shall be operative for five years from the entry into force of
the present protocol in respect of the High Contracting Party formulating the
reservation. Any reservation may be renewed for further successive periods of
five years subject to a declaration being sent to the depositary of the
Conventions not less than three months prior to the expiry of the said period. A
reservation may be withdrawn at any time by notification to this effect
addressed to the depositary of the Convention.
Through the inclusion of this article, the ICRC had two intentions. First it intended to
exclude a number of important articles from being subject to reservations. Secondly, it
sought to limit the validity of reservations to five years; if a State Party wanted to prolong
the validity of a reservation, it had to repeat the reservation, which can be regarded as an
effective mechanism of getting rid of certain reservations declared only for political
reasons that are valid for limited time. This holds true, since the States will be obliged
after five years to decide anew whether they can carry on the responsibility of denying
the validity of certain parts of humanitarian law. However, this article led to ample
discussions in Committee I and in the plenary meeting. An amendment sponsored by
twenty-one States was forwarded, which was slightly different from the proposal
forwarded in Committee I, as it preferred a new and shorter list comprising articles 1, 41,
42, and paragraph 3 of article 84, as those texts represented a development in
humanitarian law and bore witness to a widening of concern in the international
community. The oppositions to this article were based on the idea that the articles
specified had been selected on a basis that distorted the significance of the Protocol as
whole, as the United Kingdom noted, there were many articles of an inarguable
humanitarian character in the Protocol that were not included. Moreover, the United
States argued that the articles mentioned in the amendment were of a political, rather than
a humanitarian nature. Furthermore, Turkey pointed out that the adoption of such article
might prevent some States from becoming Parties to the Protocol. At the request of the
representative of Mali, a vote was taken by roll call. The result was 42 in favor, 36
against, and 17 abstentions. Not having obtained the necessary two-thirds majority, the
amendment was rejected. See Official Records, supra note 21, at 355-359. See also
BOTHE, supra note 49, at 570-572.
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to be barred from reservations. This is understood from the fact that the
first proposal to include Article 90 was introduced on May 19, 1977,
while the matter of reservations was first proposed in the ICRC draft of
1973, and was discussed extensively in Committee I and on various
occasions, before the inclusion of Article 90.
Nevertheless, it might be argued that rejecting the inclusion of
Article 85 in the draft Protocol implies that all the articles of the Protocol
can be subject to reservations. On the other hand, one can argue that
Article 85 considered the prohibition of reservations to some articles,
targeted to add emphasis to their obligatory meanings. However, the
declaration stipulated in Article 90(2)(a), is an optional clause, whereby
States should either take it or leave it as a whole. Accordingly, while
reservations to it can be prohibited, the legal basis for this prohibition
must be established.
In its Advisory Opinion on the reservations to the Genocide
Convention, the International Court of Justice ("ICJ"), stated that:
[i]n the absence of any express provisions on the subject, to
determine the possibility of making reservations as well as their
effects, one must consider their character, their purpose, their
provisions, their mode of preparation and adoption.... It follows
that the compatibility of the reservation and the object and the
purpose of the Convention is the criterion to determine the attitude of
the State which makes the reservation and of the State which
74objects.
7
The ICJ developed the criteria that reservations are inadmissible if
they are incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty. The
broad purpose of the Commission is to protect the victims of armed
conflict by obtaining the observation of the principles and rules of
international law applicable in armed conflict. Thus, it can be argued
that obstructing the Commission's potential intervention will be
incompatible with the object and purpose of the Protocol, which is
entitled "Protocol Additional ... and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts."
Furthermore, the practice of sixty States that have recognized the
competence of the Commission accentuates this view. By analogy with
the Advisory Opinion of the Permanent Court of International Justice
("PCIJ") on the competence of the International Labour Organization
with respect to Agricultural Labour, the Court opined that:
If there were any ambiguity, the Court might, for the purpose of
74. Advisory Opinion on the Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. 15 (May 28).
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arriving at the true meaning, consider the action which has been taken
under the Treaty. The Treaty was signed in June, 1919, and it was
not until October, 1921, that any of the Contracting Parties raised the
question whether agricultural labour fell within the competence of the
International Labour Organization. During the intervening period the
subject of agriculture had repeatedly been discussed and had been
dealt with in one form or another. All this might suffice to turn the
scale in favour of the inclusion of agriculture, if there were any
ambiguity.
75
Additionally, and in accordance with the Italian delegate's
viewpoint, Italy being one of the countries opposing the inclusion of
Article 85 in the ICRC draft: the "adoption of Article 85 ... would give
the impression that each State would be authorized to regard the
unmentioned provisions of the Protocol as being open to reservations.
That would be absolutely unacceptable.,
76
According to this speech, and noting the added incompatibility with
the object and purpose, and the practice of the sixty States that have
already accepted the competence of the Commission with no
reservations, one could assume that no reservations might be allowed to
the declaration.
The declarations to accept the competence of the Commission shall
be deposited with the depositary, as established by Article 90(2)(b).
"[T]his provision obliges the depositary to notify all Parties to the
Protocol, and even all Parties to the Conventions in accordance with
Article 100 (notifications), sub-paragraph (c), and not only the
Contracting Parties who made a declaration on compulsory
competence. 77  Finally, it should be noted that the Commission is
75. Advisory Opinion on the Competence of the International Labour Organization
with Respect to Agricultural Labour, 1922 P.I.C.J. (ser. B) Nos. 2 & 3, at 40, 41. The
effect of the subsequent practice of the Parties is well stated in the comment upon Article
19 of the Harvard Research Draft Convention. It stated:
In interpreting a treaty, the conduct or action of the parties thereto cannot be
ignored. If all the parties to a treaty execute it, or permit its execution, in a
particular manner, the fact may reasonably be taken into account as indicative
of the real intention of the parties or of the purpose which the instrument was
designed to serve.
Harvard Research, supra note 71. See also MCNAIR, supra note 44, at 424. For a
discussion on the effect of the subsequent practice and distinguishing its effect from
estoppel, see Bowett, Estoppel Before International Tribunals and its Relation to
Acquiescence, 33 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 176 (1957). See also Lord McNair, The Legality of
the Occupation of the Ruhr, 5 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 17 (1924).
76. Official Records, supra note 21, at 356.
77. SANDOZ, supra note 28, at 1044-1045. Article 100 of Protocol I reads as
follows:
The depositary shall inform the High Contracting Parties as well as the Parties
to the Conventions, whether or not they are signatories of this Protocol, of:
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prohibited to work on its own initiatives.
B. Enquiry: Grave Breaches and Other Serious Violations
Pursuant to Article 90(2)(c)(i) the Commission is entitled to
"enquire into any facts alleged to be a grave breach as defined in the
Conventions and the Protocol or other serious violations of the
Conventions or of this Protocol."
Thus, the Commission is competent to enquire into facts and not to
judge.78 In other words, if a State, pursuant to Article 90(2)(a) or (d),
alleged that the adversary in a conflict had committed grave breaches or
serious violations, the Commission would be competent to try to
establish whether these facts took place.79 It is crystal clear that the
Commission's area of competence is confined to grave breaches and
serious violations. Thus, it is necessary to outline those acts which
constitute grave breaches and serious violations under both the four
Geneva Conventions and Protocol I.
The 1949 Geneva Conventions distinguished between simple
breaches and grave breaches of the Conventions. Grave breaches 80 are
respectively defined in the four Geneva Conventions, in common
Articles 50, 51, 130, and 147.81
a) signatures affixed to this Protocol and the deposit of instruments of
ratification and accession under Articles 93 and 94;
b) the date of entry into force of this Protocol under Article 95;
c) communications and declarations received under Articles 84, 90 and
97;
d) declarations received under Article 96, paragraph 3, which shall be
communicated by the quickest methods; and
e) denunciations under Article 99.
Protocol I, supra note 23, art. 100.
78. SANDOZ, supra note 28, at 1045.
79. Id.
80. In 1948, the Red Cross experts introduced the concept of a particular system for
the suppression of violations, which was then developed and accepted by the Diplomatic
Conference in 1949. "This new system consists of two elements, which combine
definitions and matters of jurisdiction." The four Conventions include provisions
defining specific acts as grave breaches. In addition, the "high contracting Parties are
obliged to search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be
committed, such grave breaches, and to bring such persons regardless of nationality,
before their own courts. The combination of both aspects is today regarded as the
essence of the universality principle." See Horst Fischer, Grave Breaches of the 1949
Geneva Conventions, in 1 SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW: THE EXPERIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL COURTS 69
(Gabrielle Kirk McDonald et. al. eds., 2000).
81. Articles 50, 51, 130, and 147 of Conventions I, II, III and IV respectively, read
as follows:
Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving
any of the following acts, if committed against persons or property protected by
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The acts that constitute grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions,
if committed against persons or property protected by the Conventions,
are listed in each Convention. Due to the different scope of application
of each Convention, the proscribed grave breaches are not identical in
each of them. A collective list of grave breaches is as follows:
1. Willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including
biological experiments.
2. Willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body
or health.
3. Extensive destruction and appropriation of property not
justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully
and wantonly.
4. Compelling a prisoner of war (Third Convention) or a
protected person (Fourth Convention) to serve in the forces
of the hostile power.
5. Willfully depriving a prisoner of war (Third Convention) or
a protected person (Fourth Convention) of the rights of fair
and regular trial prescribed in the Convention.
6. Unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement
of a protected person.
7. Taking of hostages.82
In addition, establishment of a grave breach requires that the victim
be:
1) a wounded or shipwrecked member of the armed forces of
any party (including a party's own nationals);
2) a prisoner of war in the custody of a detaining power; or
3) a protected civilian, e.g., a person who is in the power of a
party of which he is not a national, and who is not of a
neutral or cobelligerent with whom the detaining power
maintains diplomatic relations.
83
Unlike the Geneva Conventions, Protocol I encompasses rules
the Convention: wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including
biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to
body or health, and extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not
justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.
The grave breaches provisions of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 deal with the
protection of victims, such as prisoners of war, who are in the power of the High
Contracting Party.
82. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Repression of Breaches of the Geneva Conventions under
the Draft Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions ofAugust 12, 1949, 8 RUTGERS-
CAM. L.J. 185 (1977). See also Thomas J. Murphy, Sanctions and Enforcement of the
Humanitarian Law of the of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Geneva Protocol I of
1977, at 103 MIL. L. REv. 3 (1984).
83. Bassiouni, supra note 82, at 195.
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relating to the conduct of armed conflict. Therefore, during the
Diplomatic Conference the issue became whether violations of these
rules should be categorized as simple breaches or grave breaches.
84
84. In the forty-third meeting held on April 23, 1976, the representative of the ICRC,
Mr. Pilloud, gave a speech which addressed the repression of breaches of humanitarian
law that had been under discussion for many years. In the sessions of the Conference of
Government Experts on the Reaffirmation and Development of the International
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, held in 1971 and 1972, it was not easy
to draft the appropriate provisions, and the results were somewhat contradictory. Thus,
the ICRC consulted some penal law experts. This enabled the ICRC to submit the March
3, 1975 document entitled "Additional study of Article 74 of draft Protocol I on the
repression of breaches of that instrument." Official Records, supra note 21, CDDH/210,
annex 2. In that document the ICRC listed the acts that should be considered as grave
breaches of the Protocol. In September 1975, at a meeting held in San Remo, a new idea
was introduced, namely, that a distinction should be made between the manner of dealing
with breaches committed on the battlefield and those committed in other areas. Attention
had likewise been drawn to the fact that it seemed difficult to determine what were grave
breaches by defining the persons and objects affected by them. Id. CDDH/ISR.43, §§ 2-
7.
However, in the course of the discussions two trends appeared. A group of States
(mainly western countries) suggested to proceed with great caution and to exclude from
the category of grave breaches those breaches committed on the battlefield. The
following statements of the delegates of Canada, U.S.A., and the United Kingdom might
clarify this viewpoint and the arguments supporting it. Mr. Miller, the Canadian delegate
stated:
in the course of those deliberations: one sought to broaden the concept of grave
breach by including other breaches therein; the other sought to proceed with
great caution with regard, in particular, to the inclusion of breaches committed
on the battlefield in the category of grave breaches ... [this] tendency to
broaden the scope of the article ... could not fail to raise awkward problems
when it came to practical application .... [that's why his delegation] deemed
that the utmost caution would be necessary if that course was taken.
Id. CDDH/IISR.43, §§ 8-10.
Mr. Breuckner, the Belgian delegate, was of a similar viewpoint. He stated that:
grave breaches was not only a moral but also a legal concept: the 1949
negotiators had made a distinction between grave breaches and acts contrary to
the provisions of the Conventions... within the meaning of the 1949
Conventions, a grave breach was a higly reprehensible act committed against
victims at the mercy of the enemy, and as such, subject to universal
jurisdiction, and leading to trial or extradition.
Id. CDDH/I/SR.44, §§ 40-48.
Mr. Bettauer, the delegate of the United States of America, was of the same opinion,
stating:
[n]one of the solutions proposed was satisfactory [referring to the ICRC draft
Article 74 (CDDH/1) and its revision (CDDH/210, annex 2) and to the various
amendments submitted], and they would, moreover, fundamentally alter the
scope of the system advocated for the repression of grave breaches. Two
approaches might be envisaged: to undertake a fundamental revision of the
criteria applied to define the term "grave breach," which was likely to prove a
lengthy and difficult task; or to adhere to the system provided for in the 1949
Geneva Conventions, subject to some minor refinements. In drafting
provisions on which penal sanctions would be based, it was of the utmost
importance to proceed with extreme caution and to be clear and precise, since
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there was a danger that any ambiguity in the provisions, .. . might be used for
political purposes. A text that was unduly ambitious might thus hamper the
application of the Conventions.... The existing provisions relating to grave
breaches or to new breaches which were strictly analogous to them, might
prove difficult to apply if extended to different kinds of violations of the
Protocol. The system applicable to grave breaches was designed to cover
situations involving persons in the hand of an adversary and definite breaches
concerning specific objects.... [He added that due to the imprecision and
ambiguity of the Protocol's provisions, this might] create the risk that any
soldier involved in a conduct of warfare, would, without intentional violation of
the Protocol's provisions, be open to charges of war crimes. [Thus his
delegation] considered that the term "grave breaches" should apply only ... to
"protected persons" and "protected objects" within the meaning of the 1949
Geneva Conventions, and to the persons referred to in Articles 42 and 64 of
draft Protocol I.
Id., CDDH/IISR.43, §§ 16-19.
The United Kingdom was also one of the opposing States. Mr. Keens, stressed the
importance that his delegation attached to the development of a practical and realistic
system for repression of breaches. He stated that:
his delegation was bound to state its reservations in regard to the grave
breaches listed in document CDDH/210, annex 2. Some countries would
undoubtedly find it very difficult to mount an enquiry into events which had
occurred in a remote part of the world and to qualify certain acts as grave
breaches when the situation was confused and evidence was lacking.
Id. § 43-46.
On the other hand, another group of States (the socialist countries, various Arab
States, and a few western countries, proposed to extend the concept of grave breaches by
including, inter alia, violations of combat rules, following the model of war crimes
tribunals (particularly the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal). The delegation of
these countries, in their statements, counter argued the viewpoints of the above-
mentioned countries.
Mr. Cassese, the Italian delegate, answered the argument advanced by the United
Kingdom delegate. He first stated that his delegation favored the idea of including
among grave breaches the use of methods and means of combat, together with the
violations of the provisions protecting the civilian population against the effects of
hostilities:
It considered that breaches of the provisions included in part III and part IV of
the draft protocol were no less serious than infringements of substantive rules
governing other equally important matters.., that argument if accepted, would
result in totally excluding battlefield crimes from the category of breaches of
the Protocol. It was difficult to think that anyone would wish to go that far if
only because those violations were already crimes under customary
international law. The same problems of proof will arise if the aim was to
make them simple breaches of the Protocol. That being so, he could not see
why such violations should not fall under the category of grave breaches.
Some of the penal provisions relating to grave breaches might even facilitate
the search for evidence. Article 79 relating to mutual assistance in criminal
matters was a case in point.
Id. §§ 46-48
Mr. Abi-Saab, the Egyptian delegate, observed that the controversy over the status
of humanitarian law was largely a function of the probability of its observance in
practice. One of the main questions that had to be addressed was how to bring about a
high correlation between humanitarian rules and actual behavior in specific situations.
He stated that his delegation considered that prevention was the most potent guarantee
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After lengthy discussions, the result was the elaboration of a list that
broadens the categories of grave breaches (Article 11(4) and Article 85),
and includes various provisions relating to combat. It does not, however,
include violations of the rules prohibiting the use of means of warfare.
Moreover, Article 11(4) of Protocol I made certain violations of
Article 11 (concerned with the protection of the physical and mental
integrity of the human person) 85 grave breaches of the Protocol.
and consistently sought to perfect the system of scrutiny of implementation. He also
stated that after the loose system of scrutiny adopted in Article 5 of the draft protocol, it
was necessary to concentrate on the repression of breaches as a remedial action. Id.
§§ 14-15. Refuting the argument of the U.S.A. delegate regarding the ambiguity and the
imprecise provisions and their consequences, he stated:
[although] many of the prohibitions in part III and IV were loosely
formulated... their violations could not be sufficiently defined to entail
criminal responsibility for their perpetrators, according to the fundamental
principle nulla poena sine lege ... [the] objection raised a technical question of
drafting, which could be taken into consideration in the Drafting Committee,
but it could not place an obstacle in the way of the sanctioning of some of the
most serious violations of Protocol I. .... [He added that] it had to be
recognized that violations committed against persons in the power of the enemy
such as maltreatment of prisoners of war or civilians in occupied territory were
much easier to conceal than air attacks against civilian objectives for instance.
Id. §§ 45-48.
For a thorough discussion on means of warfare, its general principles and evolution,
see Antonio Cassese, Means of Warfare: The Traditional and the New Law, in THE NEW
HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, (Antonio Cassese ed., 1979).
85. Article 11 reads as follows:
1. The physical or mental health and integrity of persons who are in the power
of the adverse Party or who are interned, detained or otherwise deprived of
liberty as a result of a situation referred to in Article 1 shall not be endangered
by any unjustified act or omission. Accordingly, it is prohibited to subject the
persons described in this Article to any medical procedure which is not
indicated by the state of health of the person concerned and which is not
consistent with generally accepted medical standards which would be applied
under similar medical circumstances to persons who are nationals of the Party
conducting the procedure and who are in no way deprived of liberty.
2. It is, in particular, prohibited to carry out on such persons, even with their
consent:
a) physical mutilations;
b) medical or scientific experiments;
c) removal of tissue or organs for transplantation, except where these acts
are justified in conformity with the conditions provided for in paragraph 1.
3. Exceptions to the prohibition in paragraph 2(c) may be made only in the
case of donations of blood for transfusion or of skin for grafting, provided that
they are given voluntarily and without any coercion or inducement, and then
only for therapeutic purposes, under conditions consistent with generally
accepted medical standards and controls designed for the benefit of both the
donor and the recipient.
4. Any willful act or omission which seriously endangers the physical or
mental health or integrity of any person who is in the power of a Party other
than the one on which he depends and which either violates any of the
prohibitions in paragraphs 1 and 2 or fails to comply with the requirements of
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Article 11(4) of Protocol I:
[C]onstitutes a part of the compromise on donations of blood and
skin, but it is of broader application and does not only cover
forbidden removal of tissue or organs. On the other hand, it does not
apply to every violation of paras 1, 2 and 3 of the Article, but only to
specific ones, namely:
a) to intentional violations ("any wilful act or omission")
b) to violations seriously endangering the physical or mental
health or integrity of a person
c) to violations where the victim does not belong to the same
side as the person committing the violation.
8 6
paragraph 3 shall be a grave breach of this Protocol.
5. The persons described in paragraph 1 have the right to refuse any surgical
operation. In case of refusal, medical personnel shall endeavour to obtain a
written Statement to that effect, signed or acknowledged by the patient.
6. Each Party to the conflict shall keep a medical record for every donation of
blood for transfusion or skin for grafting by persons referred to in paragraph 1,
if that donation is made under the responsibility of that Party. In addition, each
Party to the conflict shall endeavour to keep a record of all medical procedures
undertaken with respect to any person who is interned, detained or otherwise
deprived of liberty as a result of a situation referred to in Article 1. These
records shall be available at all times for inspection by the Protecting Power.
Protocol I, supra note 23, art. 11.
86. BOTHE, supra note 49, at 115. As provided in the ICRC commentary on the
Protocol, for a breach of §§ 1, 2 and 3 to be considered a grave breach, it must
accomplish the following conditions cumulatively:
a) It must be a wilful act or omission. Thus, no grave breach can be committed
through negligence, even though this may constitute a breach of paragraphs 1, 2
and 3. Moreover, the adjective wilful also omits persons with "an immature or
greatly impaired intellectual capacity ... or persons acting without knowing
what they are doing." On the other hand, "the concept of recklessness... must
also be taken to be part and parcel of the concept of wilfulness."
b) The act or omission must "seriously endanger the physical or mental health or
integrity" of the persons concerned. "This does not go as far as the principle
contained in paragraph 1 which prohibits acts or omissions which 'endanger
health."' Thus, "[t]he scope of the acts or omissions covered by paragraph 4 is
therefore more restricted. However, the health does not necessarily have to be
affected by the act or omission, but it must be clearly and significantly
endangered ......
c) "The act or omission must violate any of the prohibitions in paragraphs 1 and 2
or fail to comply with the requirements of paragraph 3 .. "
d) Finally, "the act or omission concerned must be committed against a 'person
who is in the power of a Party other than the one on which he depends."' Thus
acts or omissions committed "in connection with deprivation of liberty imposed
by a Party to the conflict on its own nationals are not considered as grave
breaches, even if they are wilful and seriously endanger their physical or
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According to Article 85(1) of Protocol I, the rules of repression of
the breaches and the grave breaches stipulated in the four Geneva
Conventions operate to the repression of all the breaches (not only to
grave breaches) of Protocol 1.87 This reference is of particular
importance as it combines the content of Article 85 referring to
repression with the obligation of State parties to try or extradite.88
Moreover, Article 85(2)89 of the Protocol extends the grave breaches
defined in the Conventions to those new categories of protected persons
introduced by the Protocol. 90
Furthermore, Article 85(3) introduces a selected number of acts
committed on the battlefield, extending the system applied in the Geneva
Conventions to elements brought into humanitarian law from the law of
mental health or integrity, and even if they are deprived of liberty, as a result of
a situation referred to in Article 1."
See SANDOZ, supra note 28, at 160.
- 87. Article 85(1) reads as follows: "The provisions of the Conventions relating to the
repression of breaches and grave breaches, supplemented by this Section, shall apply to
the repression of breaches and grave breaches of this Protocol." Protocol I, supra note
23, art. 85(1).
88. Fischer, supra note 80, at 74.
89. Article 85(2) reads as follows:
Acts described as grave breaches in the Conventions are grave breaches of this
Protocol if committed against persons in the power of an adverse Party
protected by Articles 44, 45 and 73 of this Protocol, or against the wounded,
sick and shipwrecked of the adverse Party who are protected by this Protocol,
or against those medical or religious personnel, medical units or medical
transports which are under the control of the adverse Party and are protected by
this Protocol.
Protocol I, supra note 23, art. 85(2).
90. The qualification of grave breaches is extended to acts defined as such in the
Conventions when they are committed against the following categories of persons and
objects:
[1.] Persons who have taken part in hostilities and have fallen into the power of
an adverse Party within the meaning of Articles 44 (Combatants and prisoners
of war) and 45 (Protection of persons who have taken part in hostilities): this
definition is broader than that of prisoners of war in the Third Convention;
[2.] Refugees and Stateless persons within the meaning of Article 73
(Refugees and Stateless persons) (which makes them protected persons under
the Fourth Convention);
[3.] The wounded, sick and shipwrecked of the adverse Party: Article 8, sub-
paragraphs (a) and (b) enlarges the corresponding categories as defined in the
Conventions;
[4.] Medical or religious personnel, medical units and transports under the
control of the adverse Party and protected by the Protocol: the same applies as
for the wounded, sick and shipwrecked [cf Article 8, sub-paragraphs (c), (d),
(e) and (g).] The expression "under the control of the adverse Party" is
justified by the fact that such persons and objects may come, for example, from
a non-belligerent State, an aid society recognized and authorized by such a
State or even an impartial international humanitarian organization which makes
them available to a Party to the conflict.
SANDOZ, supra note 28, at 993.
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the Hague. 9' "These acts are expressly called grave breaches of the
Protocol despite the fact that as between States which are Parties to both
the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocol I, the Geneva
Conventions apply as supplemented by Additional Protocol I.,92 The
acts stipulated in Article 85(3) are grave breaches only if they caused
death or serious injury to body or health, and are committed willfully, in
violation of the relevant provisions of the Protocol.93
In addition, Article 85(4) enumerates a set of unrelated offences that
are considered to be grave breaches.94  In other words, there is no
91. Article 85(3) reads as follows:
In addition to the grave breaches defined in Article 11, the following acts shall
be regarded as grave breaches of this Protocol, when committed willfully, in
violation of the relevant provisions of this Protocol, and causing death or
serious injury to body or health:
a) making the civilian population or individual civilians the object of attack;
b) launching an indiscriminate attack affecting the civilian population or civilian
objects in the knowledge that such attack will cause excessive loss of life,
injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects, as defined in Article 57,
paragraph 2(a)(iii);
c) launching an attack against works or installations containing dangerous forces in
the knowledge that such attack will cause excessive loss of life, injury to
civilians or damage to civilian objects, as defined in Article 57, paragraph
2(a)(iii);
d) making non-defended localities and demilitarized zones the object of attack;
e) making a person the object of attack in the knowledge that he is hors de combat;
f) the perfidious use, in violation of Article 37, of the distinctive emblem of the red
cross, red crescent or red lion and sun or of other protective signs recognized
by the Conventions or this Protocol.
Protocol I, supra note 23, art. 85(3).
92. Fischer, supra note 80, at 69.
93. The relevant provisions to Article 85(3)(a) are: Article 49 (Definition of attacks
and scope of application); Article 50 (Definition of civilians and civilian population);
Article 51 (Protection of the civilian population); and Article 57 (Precautions in attack).
Protocol I, supra note 23, art. 49, 50, 51, 57.
The relevant provisions to Article 85(3)(b) are: Article 49 (Definition of attacks and
scope of application); Article 50 (Definition of civilians and civilian population); Article
51 (Protection of the civilian population); Article 52 (General protection of civilian
objects); and Article 57 (Precautions in attack). Id. art. 49, 50, 51, 52, 57.
The relevant provisions to Article 85(3)(c) are: Article 49 (Definition of attacks and
scope of application); Article 50 (Definition of civilians and civilian population); Article
51 (Protection of the civilian population); Article 52 (General protection of civilian
objects); Article 56 (Protection of works and installations containing dangerous force);
and Article 57 (Precautions in attack). Id. art. 49, 50, 51, 52, 56, 57.
The relevant provisions to Article 85(3)(d) are: Article 59 (Non-defended localities);
and Article 60 (Demilitarized zones). Id. art. 59, 60.
The relevant provision to Article 85 (3)(e) is Article 41 (Safeguard of an enemy hors
de combat). Id. art. 41.
The relevant provisions to Article 85(3)(f) are: Article 37 (Prohibition of perfidy);
and Article 38 (Recognized emblems). Id. art. 37, 38.
94. Article 85(4) reads as follows:
In addition to the grave breaches defined in the preceding paragraphs and in the
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common denominator for the acts declared to be grave breaches in
paragraph four other than the fact that they fit into neither paragraph two
nor paragraph three. 95 These acts declared as grave breaches are subject
to two conditions: that they be committed 1) willfully; and 2) in
violation of the Conventions or Protocol I. Unlike Article 85(3), Article
85(4) does not lay down particular consequences (like death or serious
injury to body or health) as constitutive elements which the grave
breaches it defines have in common.96 Finally, Article 85(5) provides a
general clause, stipulating that the grave breaches of the Conventions and
Protocol I shall be regarded as war crimes.9 7 However, it is subject to the
reservation that this is without prejudice to the application of the
Conventions and of the Protocol.98
Apparently, "the demarcation line between the 'grave breaches' and
other violations of the Conventions and the Protocols is a vague one."99
Interestingly, Protocol I provides a new category of violations or
Conventions, the following shall be regarded as grave breaches of this Protocol,
when committed wilfully and in violation of the Conventions or the Protocol:
a) the transfer by the occupying Power of parts of its own civilian
population into the territory it occupies, or the deportation or transfer of all
or parts of the population of the occupied territory within or outside this
territory, in violation of Article 49 of the Fourth Convention;
b) unjustifiable delay in the repatriation of prisoners of war or civilians;
c) practices of apartheid and other inhuman and degrading practices
involving outrages upon personal dignity, based on racial discrimination;
d) making the clearly-recognized historic monuments, works of art or
places of worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of
peoples and to which special protection has been given by special
arrangement, for example, within the framework of a competent
international organization, the object of attack, causing as a result
extensive destruction thereof, where there is no evidence of the violation
by the adverse Party of Article 53, subparagraph (b), and when such
historic monuments, works of art and places of worship are not located in
the immediate proximity of military objectives;
e) depriving a person protected by the Conventions or referred to in
paragraph 2 of this Article of the rights of fair and regular trial.
Protocol I, supra note 23, art. 85(4).
95. BOTHE, supra note 49, at 517.
96. SANDOZ, supra note 28, at 999.
97. Article 85(5) reads as follows: "Without prejudice to the application of the
Conventions and of this Protocol, grave breaches of these instruments shall be regarded
as war crimes." Protocol I, supra note 23, art. 85(5).
98. It should be noted that, during the preparatory work, the addition of the phrase
"without prejudice to the application of the Conventions and of the Protocol" was "to
make it clear that the declaration that grave breaches are war crimes has neither the
consequence that all war crimes are grave breaches nor the result that persons found
guilty of having committed grave breaches lose the protection of humanitarian law." See
BOTHE, supra note 49, at 521.
99. Bert V.A. Roling, Aspects of the Criminal Responsibility for Violations of the
Laws of War, in THE NEW HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 213 (Antonio
Cassese ed., 1979).
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breaches, not mentioned in either the Four Geneva Conventions or in
Protocol 11,100 namely, the "serious violations." The term "serious
violations" was mentioned outside of Article 90, in Article 89 of Protocol
1.101 The characteristic of the word "serious" is obviously related to the
severity, while the characteristic of the word "violation" is related to a
conduct (either act or omission) that is contrary to the Conventions and
the Protocol. 102 However, the scope and meaning of the term "serious
violations," remains indistinct. 10 3 Thus, in the commentary on Article
89, the ICRC suggested that such violations include the following
conduct:
[1] isolated instances of conduct, not included amongst the grave
breaches, but nevertheless of a serious nature.
[2] conduct which is not included amongst the grave breaches, but
which takes on a serious nature because of the frequency of the
individual acts committed or because of the systematic repetition
thereof or because of circumstances;
[3] "global" violations, for example, acts whereby a particular
situation, aterritory or a whole category of persons or objects is
withdrawn from the application of the Conventions or the Protocol. °4
Roling suggested that, "[f]rom the context of Article 90[(2)(c)(i)],
one is entitled to conclude that a 'serious violation' is something between
a non-grave and a 'grave breach,' something that is less than a 'grave
breach.""0 5 Additionally, the ICRC commentary suggestions imply that
the term "serious violations" constitutes a category of violations that falls
between the "grave breaches" and the "simple breaches" envisaged in
both the Conventions and the Protocol.
Nevertheless, it might be argued that the suggestions contained in
the ICRC commentary, which imply that "serious violations" exist as a
category between "simple breaches" and "grave breaches," are
paradoxical with the ICRC commentary itself. The ICRC commentary
provides that "[t]he United Nations actions [in response to serious
violations] to which Article 89 refers may therefore consist, ... where
100. Protocol (II) Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978).
101. The term "serious violations" has been mentioned in Protocol I in only one
article besides Article 90, which is Article 89. Article 89 reads as follows: "In situations
of serious violations of the Conventions or of this Protocol, the High Contracting Parties
undertake to act jointly or individually, in co-operation with the United Nations and in
conformity with the United Nations Charter." Protocol I, supra note 23, art. 89.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. SANDOZ, supra note 28, at 1033.
105. Roling, supra note 99, at 213.
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appropriate, of coercive actions which may include the use of armed
force."'
106
If one places a number of considerations in mind, a contrary view
will present itself. The primary consideration here is that in
determination of the severity of a conduct (excluding the consequence of
the conduct upon the protected persons or objects, since serious
violations, grave and simple breaches might overlap in effect), one of the
main elements is to consider the consequences that emerge as a result of
this conduct (condemnation and sanctions). In the international
community, disregarding political motivations, these consequences are
crystallized in the degree of the condemnation of conduct, and the
typology of action that might be conceived to repress it. According to
the ICRC commentary, in situations of "serious violations," the United
Nations can use armed force.10 7 This is the utmost action that can be
undertaken by the topmost organization in the international community.
Thus, one might deduce that "serious violations" are more severe than
"grave breaches."
On the other hand, it can be argued that the categories provided by
the ICRC commentary imply that the concept of "serious violations" is a
wide one that encompasses that of "grave breaches," in conjunction with
other violations of a serious nature. This is true insofar that maintaining
the opposing view in the aforementioned argument only allows the
United Nations to use armed force and intervene in serious violations. It
does not give it such leeway in case of "grave breaches." This is
unacceptable, in view of the fact that, "from the treaty history [the
Geneva Conventions] it seems to be clear that the term 'grave breaches'
was chosen.., to emphasize the difference between these crimes of
serious character and ordinary crimes.
10 8
However, consideration of the recent International Statutes and
Judgments is enlightening. For example, the Statute of the International
Criminal Tribunal of former Yugoslavia, in Article 1 under the title
"Competence of the International Tribunal," reveals that: "[t]he
International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons
responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law
committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991 in
accordance with the provisions of the present Statute."'0 9 Moreover, in
106. SANDOZ, supra note 28, at 1035.
107. Official Records, supra note 21.
108. Fischer, supra note 80, at 70.
109. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible
for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of
the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 4 8th Sess., U.N. Doc.
5/RES/827 (1993).
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Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic the Court stated that, "[a] systematic
construction of the Statute emphasizes the fact that various provisions, in
spelling out the purpose and tasks of the International Tribunal or in
defining its functions, refer to 'serious violations' of international
humanitarian law." 10  This view is emphasized in the Statute of the
International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda' and the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court.112
Thus, it might be concluded that "serious violations" is of a broad
meaning comprising "grave breaches" and other violations of a serious
nature. Moreover, this view might be supported through a consideration
of the wording of Article 90(2)(c)(i), which uses the phrase "or other
serious violations. ' 13 Here, the phrase "or other" implies that the grave
breaches are considered to be serious violations, but the serious
violations are not limited to grave breaches.
However, it should be noted that ambiguity and lack of definitions
are the most reasonable grounds upon which States may be motivated to
elude the signature, ratification, or accession to treaties. Thus, it is
imperative that the Commission define the "serious violations" that fall
within its competence. It should do so with the guidance of the
developments in international law, given that "[m]inor violations may
become serious if they are repeated."' 
1 4
As previously mentioned, the Commission is only competent to
enquire into facts and not to judge. This leads one to ask whether or not
restriction is absolute, especially in the context of evaluating an alleged
violation. It is clearly established that the competence of the
Commission to enquire does not extend to all the alleged facts or
violations submitted by the Parties to a conflict. This is due to the fact
that it is only constrained to enquire into "grave breaches" and "serious
violations" of the Conventions and the Protocol. Thus, evidently,
establishing the competence of the Commission is tied to judging the
alleged violation. Nevertheless, the Commission "must be careful not to
include.., elements of legal evaluation in its report. ' 115 Moreover, its
110. The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Int'l Crim. Trib. of the
Former Yugoslavia, (Oct. 2, 1995) (decision on the defense motion for interlocutory
appeal on jurisdiction).
11. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible
for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in Rwanda,
annexed to S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 4 9 th Sess., U.N. Doc. 5/RES/955 (1994).
112. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, United Nations Diplomatic
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court
on July 17, 1998, preamble, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 [hereinafter the Rome Statute].
113. Protocol I, supra note 23, art. 90(2)(c)(i).
114. SANDOZ, supra note 28, at 1045.
115. Id.
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legal appreciation must remain an internal element and can lead neither
to a formal judgment nor even to a report on the law to be applied.' 16
C. Good Offices
Under the chapeau "the Commission shall be competent to," Article
90(2)(c)(ii) provides as follows: "facilitate, through its good offices, the
restoration of an attitude of respect for the Conventions and this
Protocol." This provision authorizes the second function of the
Commission, which is to perform good offices with the object of
facilitating prevention or repression of breaches of the Conventions and
the Protocol. 17 This provision emerged from a Japanese amendment."18
The dictionary definition attached to the term "good offices" is "the
involvement of one or more countries or an international organization in
a dispute between other countries with the aim of contributing to its
settlement or at least easing relations between the disputing countries.'," 19
Unlike the delineated area of competence of the Commission in
inquiring (only in grave breaches and serious violations), the area of
competence of the Commission to perform good offices is not specified.
However, one author suggested confining the competence of the
Commission in performing good offices to "serious violations," stating
that:
[a]t first sight it is not quite clear whether or not the violation has to
be "serious." Considering, however, that the Commission is
116. BOTHE, supra note 49, at 544.
117. Protocol I, supra note 23, art. 90(2)(c)(ii).
118. Mr. Yamato introduced the Japanese amendment, which called for inclusion of
good offices as one of the functions to be assigned to the Commission concomitantly with
enquiring. He stated that:
[a]s there were historical examples to show that inquiry Commissions set up
solely for the purpose of investigating an incident or an alleged violation had
often played a useful intermediary role between the Parties to a conflict, his
delegation recommended that the Conference should adopt a provision enabling
the inquiry Commission to perform its good offices so as to facilitate the
repression or prevention of breaches, but only in so far as there was no risk of
its failing to be impartial.
Official Records, supra note 21, CDDH/I/SR.56, § 20.
In the Working Group, the expression "facilitate through its good offices, repression
or prevention of breaches and to restore an attitude of respect for the Conventions and the
Protocol" was generally supported, which was a combination of two proposals submitted
by Pakistan and Japan. However, a number of amendments were still brought before
Committee I. "The text adopted by Committee I and also by plenary meeting has simpler
wording, that is, 'facilitate, through its good offices the restoration of an attitude of
respect for the Conventions and this Protocol."' This quote came from the amendment of
the German Democratic Republic as further amended by the USA. See Takemoto, supra
note 20, at 38.
119. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 701 (7thed. 1999) [hereinafter BLACK'S].
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supposed to enquire into grave breaches or "serious violations"
exclusively and further taking into account the aspects of "procedural
economy," it is suggested that it must be a "serious" violation. 120
This suggestion is not constructed on solid bases. First, and from a
humanitarian and preventative viewpoint, if the Commission is entitled
to perform good offices in simple breaches, it will prevent the worsening
of many situations. This holds true, as many simple breaches might
escalate into serious violations or grave breaches. Thus, it could be
deemed necessary to perform good offices in simple breaches to prevent
deterioration of situations.
Second, and as stipulated in Article 90(2)(c)(ii), the goal of good
offices is to "facilitate the restoration of an attitude of respect for the
Conventions and this Protocol."'121 It, thus, did not confine the good
offices to serious violations or grave breaches. Conversely, it provides a
flexible concept for performing good offices.
Third, the competence of the Commission to enquire is irrelevant to
the competence of the Commission to perform good offices. In fact, the
two channels are completely unconnected. Thus, it is unpersuasive to
invoke the Commission's area of competence in enquiring (which is an
investigation process), in determining its competence in performing good
offices (which is a contribution aiming to settle a dispute or ease
relations). This holds true in view of two aspects. First, Article 90(3)
and (4) provides certain procedures for inquiring; meanwhile no such
procedures are provided for good offices.'2 2 Second, the outcomes of the
two mechanisms are different, as the enquiry culminates in a report
submitted to the Parties. On the other hand, there is no such result in
good offices, since that function merely culminates in recommendations
to the parties. Consequently, one can conclude that good offices can be
offered in the event of any breach of the Conventions and the Protocol
and are not limited to serious violations or grave breaches.
However, two questions might be significant in offering good
offices. First, whether the Commission needs a request to "offer" good
offices or whether it can "offer" on its own initiative. Second, whether
offering good offices should be limited to situations where the States
(parties to a conflict or dispute) are parties to the Conventions and the
Protocol.
There is no easy answer to the first question. Article 90 is silent on
120. Kussbach, supra note 33, at 178. This seems to be the viewpoint of the ICRC
commentators, as it was stated that, "when it has taken note of facts which seem to it to
constitute grave breaches or serious violations, the Commission is invited to facilitate,
through its good offices...- See SANDOZ, supra note 28, at 1046.
121. Protocol I, supra note 23, art. 90(2)(c)(ii).
122. Id. art. 90(3) and (4).
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the issue, and the ICRC did not address this issue. Conversely, a
minimal amount of scholarly work has been undertaken for the review
and analysis of the law and practice of good offices. It is, therefore,
necessary to refer to the practice of good offices in answer to this
question. In 1958 the U.S. and U.K. practiced good offices in a dispute
between France and Tunisia following a French attack on a Tunisian
village. 23 In this case, "the United States informed the Tunisian and
French Governments of its willingness to make available its good offices
in conjunction with the United Kingdom."'' 24  This denotes that good
offices might be offered even without being requested by the Parties to a
conflict (but it is subject to the acceptance of the Parties to the conflict).
This fact will enhance the role of the Commission, enabling it to launch
its activities and gain credibility.
Considering the second question, one must take into account the
silence of Article 90 and the preparatory work, while bearing in mind
123. After an attack on the Tunisian village of Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef on February 8,
1958 by French military aircraft, "allegedly to deal with an Algerian rebel stronghold,"
Tunisia informed the United Nations Secretary General on February 9 of the actions
which were characterized as "armed aggression" and proclaimed that the Tunisian
Government in self-defense had banned French troops stationed in Tunisia from leaving
their barracks and had recalled its Ambassador in Paris. "On February 12, the Tunisian
Government requested the Security Council to consider its complaint [S/3952] regarding
the French attack" and to take whatever action it might deem appropriate to put an end to
the conditions threatening Tunisian security and international peace and security. In a
counter complaint (S/3954), France asked the Council to consider the situation "resulting
from the aid furnished by Tunisia to rebels enabling them to conduct operations from
Tunisian territory directed against the integrity of French territory and safety of the
persons and property of French nationals." The Tunisian and the French Governments
accepted the offer. However, the following statement was made by the United States
representative Mr. Wadsworth. After confirming the offer of good offices, he stated:
[I]n the first instance, the responsibility for a peaceful solution of the
differences which are outstanding between France and Tunisia lies with those
two countries under Article 33 of the United Nations Charter. The fact that the
Governments of these two countries have elected to accept the good offices, of
two mutual friends is taken by my Government as an indication of their sincere
desire to reach a solution .... To a large extent, the precise manner in which
these good offices are to be implemented will have to be worked out by the
four powers involved. As one of the two powers which are extending their
good offices, the United States hopes to be able to offer affirmative suggestions
to advance the objective of a peaceful and equitable solution of these problems.
12 MARJORIE M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 997-998 (1971).
The United Kingdom representative, Mr. Dixon, also stated:
[I]t clearly remains to be seen how the good offices which we had offered can
in practice best be exercised, but it is certainly our intention to proceed with
this task with the deepest sense of responsibility. While our essential object is
to bring the Governments of France and Tunisia together, we may wish to offer
some positive suggestions to them....
Id.
124. Id. at 997.
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that the good offices, from a humanitarian perspective, will help in
settling disputes and easing situations between the parties to a conflict.
This can consequently prevent violations or, at least, prevent their
intensification. In addition, if one considered the general non-
discriminatory character of the humanitarian law, one can infer that
offering good offices is not confined to the parties of the Conventions
and the Protocol.
Finally, it should be noted that the recommendations submitted by
the Commission, as a result of its good offices, are subject to the same
condition (non inclusion of any legal evaluation) aforesaid in the reports
submitted as an outcome of the enquiry process. Additionally, good
offices should be offered after any enquiry, because, if it is performed, it
might help in diminishing tension between the Parties. This will lead to
the observance and respect of humanitarian law, which is the primary
aim of the Conventions and the Protocols.
D. Other Situations
Article 90(2)(d) stipulates that, "[i]n other situations, the
Commission shall institute an enquiry at the request of a Party to the
conflict only with the consent of the other Party or Parties concerned."'1
25
"In other situations," is the loose and general phrase with which
Article 90(2)(d) commences. 126 Proposed by the German Democratic
Republic representative, this provision was initially Article 90(2)(a) of
the Committee draft. It was originally read as follows: "[a]t the request
of a Party to the conflict, the Commission shall institute an enquiry with
the consent of the other Parties concerned in relation to any alleged
violation of the Conventions or of this Protocol."
27
This provision was subject to an amendment by the United States of
America128 and it was transferred to Article 90(2)(d). However, "there
was an assurance not only from the sponsors but also from the
representative of the GDR, that no substantial change was intended, only
an improvement in the drafting. It has to be doubted whether the change
is an improvement."
129
125. Protocol I, supra note 23, art. 90(2)(d).
126. Id.
127. BOTHE, supra note 49, at 543-544.
128. The amendment of the United States of America was in the forty-fifth Plenary
meeting, held on May 30, 1977. Mr. Aldrich, the U.S. representative, while introducing
the amendment, stated that "[i]n the new sub-paragraph (d) the obligation to obtain the
consent of the Party which was the subject of the enquiry was retained." The amendment
was put to vote, and it was adopted by 43 votes in favor, 13 votes against and 33
abstentions. See Official Records, supra note 21, at 325.
129. BOTHE, supra note 49, at 544.
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Although it is agreed in the ICRC commentary, and most of the few
scholarly works analyzing this provision, that it refers to Article 90(2)(a)
and not to Article 90(2)(c), the position of this reference is questionable.
According to the interpretation doctrine ejusdem generis, "when a
general word or phrase follows a list of specific persons or things, the
general word or phrase will be interpreted to include only persons or
things of the same type. ' 3 The expression noscitur a sociis is "a canon
of construction holding that the meaning of an unclear word or phrase
should be determined by the words immediately surrounding it."
131
Thus, it might be argued that according to the aforementioned doctrines
of interpretation, Article 90(2)(d) refers to Article 90(2)(c) and not to
Article 90(2)(a).
Application of the abovementioned interpretation can be
convincing. However, if Article 90(2)(d) is read in conjunction with
Article 90(2)(e) (which will be discussed in the following sub-section),
this interpretation is unacceptable. This is due to the fact that, should the
competence of the Commission be extended to situations other than
grave breaches and serious violations in the Conventions and the
Protocol, the Commission will be competent to enquire as to all the
violations of the Conventions and the Protocol. This will lead to the
suspension of the enquiry system of the Conventions (articles 52, 53,
132, and 149), contrary to the stipulation of Article 90(2)(e).
Nevertheless, the interpretation of the ICRC commentary seems to
be more concordant with the wording of Article 90(2)(d). This holds
true, as it offers the possibility of turning to the Commission to those
States that have not recognized the mandatory competence of the
Commission according to the optional clause in Article 90(2)(a). Thus,
in providing an alternative to the compulsory competence, it touches on
consent, which is more likely to be related to Article 90(2)(a). Thus,
"[t]his provision has the advantage of allowing all Parties to an armed
conflict, including national liberation movements, to resort to the
Commission on a case-by-case basis, subject, however, to the condition
that the challenged Party gives its consent."
132
E. Common Articles 52, 53, 132. 149 and Article 90
The relationship between the enquiry system of the Four Geneva
Conventions of 1949 and Article 90 is illustrated in Article 90(2)(e).
133
130. BLACK'S, supra note 119, at 535.
131. Id. at 1084. For a thorough discussion for the doctrines of interpreting the
general words and special words, see MCNAIR, supra note 44, at 393-410.
132. SANDOz, supra note 28, at 1047.
133. This provision originated from an oral amendment proposed by the United States
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That Article provides that, "[s]ubject to the foregoing provisions of this
paragraph, the provisions of Article 52 of the First Convention, Article
53 of the Second Convention, Article 132 of the Third Convention and
Article 149 of the Fourth Convention shall continue to apply to any
alleged violation of this Protocol. ' 34
Common Articles 52, 53, 132, and 149 of the Four Geneva
Conventions respectively, read as follows:
At the request of a Party to the conflict, an enquiry shall be instituted,
in a manner to be decided between the interested Parties, concerning
any alleged violation of the Convention. If agreement has not been
reached concerning the procedure for the enquiry, the Parties should
agree on the choice of an umpire who will decide upon the procedure
to be followed. Once the violation has been established, the Parties
to the conflict shall put an end to it and shall repress it with the least
possible delay.
135
Inevitably, the question that will arise is: What is the impact of
adopting Article 90 as whole, and particularly Article 90(2)(e), on the
enquiry articles in the Four Geneva Conventions? The answer may be
found in the phrase "subject to the foregoing provisions of this
paragraph," and paragraph two in its entirety.
It should be noted that the impact of the inclusion of Article
90(2)(e) on the compulsory competence system in the Conventions and
on the area of competence emanates from a general interpretation rule.
of America at the time when Committee I was going to adopt that Article. Discussions
focused on its procedural aspects: whether the manner of its submission was permissible
under the Rules of Procedure of the Conference, whether priority for voting should be
given to the second paragraph of the final working paper or to the amendment of the
German Democratic Republic with the United States of America oral amendment, and
whether voting should take place on the second paragraph as a whole or on sub-paragraph
by sub-paragraph. There was no debate on the substance of Article 90(2)(e). Takemoto,
supra note 20.
However, an interesting speech was made by the Syrian delegate while explaining
his vote against Article 90 as whole in its present form. He stated:
[B]y providing for optional recourse by the opposing Parties to the proposed
Fact-Finding Commission, paragraph 2 of the article adds nothing to the legal
position already in effect under the 1949 Geneva Conventions. On the
contrary, the wording of sub-paragraph (a) of the paragraph concerned
[paragraph 2] is a retrograde step compared with the Conventions. While
Articles 52, [53], 132, 149 of the Conventions state that "an enquiry shall be
instituted", if necessary, the wording of paragraph 2 of this article leaves it to
the Parties to the conflict to decide whether or not to resort to an enquiry.
There is no element of compulsion.
See Official Records, supra note 21, at 384.
134. Protocol I, supra note 23, art. 90(2)(e).
135. First Convention, supra note 12, art. 52; Second Convention, supra note 17, art.
53; Third Convention, supra note 17, art. 132; Fourth Convention, supra note 17, art.
149.
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According to this rule, the provisions of an earlier treaty should be
subject to the provisions of a later one, and the general provisions are
subject to special ones. The Permanent Court of International Justice in
the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions case 136 expressed this view,
maintaining that "in case of doubt, the Protocol, being a special and more
recent agreement, should prevail."'137 Thus, if the provisions of an earlier
treaty are general, and those of the later are special and detailed, that fact
indicates that the parties intended the special one to prevail.
It seems that the enquiry provisions in the Conventions are affected
by the inclusion of Article 90(2)(e) in two particulars. First, "the
compulsory system envisaged in the common articles of the Conventions
has been altered by the inclusion of that phrase in the Protocol to a
voluntary system based on the consent of the parties concerned.
138
Second, the grave breaches and the serious violations are excluded from
the competence of the enquiry system of the Conventions. In other
words, the area of competence of the enquiry system of the Conventions
will be limited to other violations and not grave breaches or serious
violations of the Conventions and the Protocol. Conversely, the
Commission's area of competence is also restricted to grave breaches
and serious violations of the Conventions and the Protocol, as stipulated
in Article 90(2)(c)(i).
Although Article 90(2)(e) narrowed the area of competence of the
enquiry provisions of the Conventions, it expanded its competence to
include the other violations (not grave breaches or serious violations)
envisaged in the Protocol. It did so through the inclusion of the phrase
"shall continue to apply to any alleged violation of this Protocol." Thus,
in regard to other violations that are not grave breaches or serious
violations of the Conventions, the enquiry provisions in the Conventions
will continue to apply, and these provisions will be extended to the same
categories of violations of Protocol I.
4. The Chamber of Enquiry
The Chamber of enquiry is that body which undertakes all
enquiries. The following two subsections shall highlight the constitution
of the Chamber and the manner in which it conducts enquiry.
136. In this case the two litigating parties, Great Britain and Greece, were both parties
to two instruments alleged to be in conflict: the Mandate dated July 24, 1922, and
Protocol XII, annexed to the Treaty of Lausanne, dated July 24, 1923. Mavrommatis
Palestine Concessions (Greece v. Gr. Brit.), 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 2 (Aug. 30)
[hereinafter Palestine Concessions].
137. Palestine Concessions, supra note 136, at 31.
138. Takemoto, supra note 20, at 43.
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A. Composition of the Chamber of Enquiry
Article 90(3)(a), reads as follows:
(a) Unless otherwise agreed by the Parties concerned, all inquiries
shall be undertaken by a Chamber consisting of seven members
appointed as follows:
(i) five members of the Commission, not nationals of any Party
to the conflict, appointed by the President of the Commission
on the basis of equitable representation of the geographical
areas, after consultation with the Parties to the conflict;
(ii) two ad hoc members, not nationals of any Party to the
conflict, one to be appointed by each side.
139
Upon the receipt of a request 40 for an enquiry (a competent request
after examination) 41 either on the permanent basis or the ad hoc basis,
139. Protocol I, supra note 23, at Article 90(3)(a).
140. Under the title "Lodging the request," Rule 20 of the Rules of Procedure of the
Commission provides as follows:
1. The request for an enquiry shall be addressed to the Secretariat.
2. It shall state the facts that, in the opinion of the requesting party, constitute a
grave breach or a serious violation, as well as the date and the place of their
occurrence.
3. It shall list the evidence the requesting party wishes to present in support of
its allegations.
4. It shall name the authority to which all communications concerning the
enquiry shall be addressed, as well as the most expedient means of contacting
that authority.
5. Where applicable and to the extent possible, it shall contain, in the
enclosure, the original or a certified copy of any document cited in the list of
evidence.
6. If the Commission receives a request for an enquiry under article 90(2)(d),
and the consent of the other party or parties concerned has not yet been
indicated, the Commission shall refer the request to that party or those parties
with a request that it or they indicate its or their consent.
Rules of the IHFFC, supra note 27, Rule 20.
141. Providing the procedures to be followed upon the receipt of a request for an
enquiry, and under the title of "Examination of the request for an enquiry," Rule 21 of the
Rules of Procedure of the Commission reads as follows:
1. On receiving a request for an enquiry, the President shall without delay
advise the interested party or parties of it. He shall send them, as soon as
possible, a copy of the request as well as its enclosures and, subject to Rule
20(6), advise them of their right to submit, within a fixed time period, their
observations concerning the admissibility of the request. The setting of that
time limit does not however prevent the Commission from opening the enquiry
at once.
2. The Commission may ask the requesting party to supply additional
information within a fixed time limit.
3. If the competence of the Commission is contested, the latter shall decide by
2003]
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the Chamber of enquiry should be set up to undertake the enquiry. The
phrase "unless otherwise agreed by the Parties concerned" is significant
and thus worthy of comment. In essence, it leaves an opening for "the
possibility of any other solution which the Parties concerned may choose
in common agreement, [thus Protocol I] remain[ing] flexible and
susceptible to any other formulation.' 42 This clause can be interpreted
in the sense of its being conceivable that an enquiry be requested
between more than two parties to a conflict. Therefore, this clause can
be employed to legitimize the composition of a Chamber of more than
seven members through the appointment of an ad hoc member by each
party. Moreover, the number of Commission members appointed to the
Chamber can be in excess of five. This is illustrated in the case of a
multi-party conflict where an alliance between a number of the parties, in
excess of five, could constitute a quorum.
The Chamber cannot perform good offices, as it is only competent
to undertake enquiries. It is composed of seven members, five of whom
are members of the Commission to be appointed by the President and
non-nationals of the Parties to the conflict. 143 Although the possibility of
the President being a national of a State party to the conflict is not
addressed in Article 90(3), the solution is presented in Rule 9 of the
Rules of the Procedure of the Commission. Thus, if this case arose, the
President should assign the appointment of the members of the Chamber
to the first Vice President or the second Vice President.
144
means of speedy consultation.
4. The Commission shall inform the requesting party if the request does not
meet the conditions described in Rule 20, or if an enquiry cannot be conducted
for any other reason.
5. All parties to the conflict shall be informed of the Commission's decision to
open an enquiry.
6. If, in the course of an enquiry, the requesting party communicates to the
Commission the withdrawal of its request, the Chamber shall cease its enquiry
only with the consent of the other parties to the conflict. The withdrawal does
not affect the payment of the costs of the enquiry in accordance with article
90(7) of the Protocol.
142. SANDOZ, supra note 28, at 1048.
143. It was envisaged during the preparatory work that the members of the Chamber
must be nationals of neutral states so that the enquiry could be conducted in completely
objective conditions, in other words, the members of the Chamber have to be nationals of
States that maintain diplomatic relations with all States Parties to the conflict. See
Official Records, supra note 21, at 209.
144. Under the title of "Temporary Replacement of the President," Rule 9 of the
Rules of Procedure of the Commission reads as follows:
The first Vice-President shall take the place of the President if the presidency is
vacant or the President is prevented from carrying out his duties, especially if,
in the case of an enquiry, he is a national of a party to the conflict. The second
Vice-President shall replace the first Vice-President if the latter is prevented
from carrying out his duties or if the office of first Vice-President is vacant.
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The members of the Chamber should be appointed on the basis of
equitable geographical representation. However, in this context,
equitable geographical has several interpretations. First, it can be
interpreted as pertaining to the neutral countries surrounding the parties
to the conflict. Second, one may interpret it as relating to the same legal
systems or civilizations. Third, it could be understood as the
appointment of members, from neutral surrounding countries, or at least
there should be members appointed to the Chamber from these neutral
surrounding countries. This last interpretation could function to facilitate
the task and enhance efficiency of the Chamber. However, it should be
noted that the Chamber might need to take into account the cultures of
the parties. Moreover, the national laws of the parties concerned should
be considered, to the extent that they are consistent with the relevant
international standards.
Although the President is assigned to appoint those five members,
he must consult the parties to the conflict. Such consultation is
obligatory according to the wording of Article 90(3)(a). However, the
critical question is whether the President is obliged to comply with the
results of the consultations or not. One author suggested that, should the
President appoint members without the agreement of the parties to the
conflict, he would be effectively jeopardizing the success of the enquiry.
Accordingly, the obligation of consultation could well be transformed
into a procedure of a binding opinion. 145 On the other hand the ICRC
commentary suggested that, "the President is not formally bound by the
opinion of the Parties that have been consulted."'146 Nonetheless, one can
argue that the opinions of the parties to the conflict should ethically bind
the President. That could be the case only if the disagreement is built on
a reasonable basis that might negatively affect the credibility and the
efficiency of the Chamber.
The two ad hoc members of the Chamber, who are to be appointed
by the parties to the conflict, might or might not be members of the
Commission. They "represent" the party that has appointed them. 147
The ad hoc members are also subject to the condition that they should
not be nationals of the parties to the conflict. Although it seems that no
qualifications are required in the ad hoc members, practically speaking,
The third Vice-President shall replace the second Vice-President if the latter is
prevented from carrying out his duties or if the office of second Vice-President
is vacant.
Rules of the IHFFC, supra note 27, Rule 9.
145. Philippe Bretton, La Mise en Oeuvre des Protocoles de Geneve de 1977, at 95
REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC ET DE LA SCIENCE POLITIQUE EN FRANCE ET A L'ETRANGER 379
(1979).
146. SANDOZ, supra note 28, at 1048.
147. Id.
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the ad hoc members might raise doubt over the impartiality of the
Chamber and the enquiry. This is due to the fact that each party to the
conflict will appoint one of them and he/she will be representing this
party. Thus, it must be suggested that they possess the qualifications
outlined in Article 90(1)(a). This is because they will be members of the
Chamber, which is the body that carries the investigation task as a
division of the Commission. This view might be supported by the ICRC
commentary, which states that ad hoc members "should contribute to
creating an atmosphere of trust within the chamber itself.'
' 48
Impartiality is essential in creating this atmosphere of trust. Moreover,
the view of the ICRC Commentary might be further supported by the fact
that, during the preparatory work, the suggestion that the Chamber
should embody ad hoc members appointed by the parties to the conflict
was based on a Japanese amendment. Here, the Japanese delegates
stated that, "experience showed that the participation of ad hoc members
appointed by the Parties to the conflict would facilitate the Commission's
work and ensure respect for its findings. 149
Given the importance of the time frame, insofar as it impacts both
the success of the enquiry and the fate of the victims in the time of armed
conflict, Article 90(3)(b) provides that the President is obliged to specify
an appropriate time limit for the enquiry Chamber to be set up. The
stated provision targeted the negation of any attempts by a party, or
parties, to the conflict, to impede the setup of the Chamber. The parties
could impede the setup of the Chamber by delaying their appointment of
the ad hoc members. The consequences for the failure to appoint the ad
hoc member or members by the party or the parties to the conflict will be
that the President shall (himself or herself) appoint two ad hoc members,
"perhaps after a final consultation with the parties."' 50
Surprisingly, neither Article 90(3)(b) nor the Rules of Procedure of
the Commission1 51 provide any guidelines for the appropriate time limit,
148. Id.
149. Official Records, supra note 21, at 194.
150. SANDOZ, supra note 28, at 1049.
151. Rule 23 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission, entitled "Formation of the
Chamber" reads as follows:
Unless the interested parties agree otherwise, the following provisions apply:
a) The President shall appoint, after consultation with the Bureau and the
parties to the conflict, and on the basis of equitable geographical
representation, five Members of the Chamber, not nationals of any party to
the conflict.
b) The President shall invite the parties concerned to appoint, within a
fixed time period, two additional persons, not nationals of any party to the
conflict, as ad hoc Members of the Chamber.
c) If one or both of the ad hoc Members have not been appointed within
the time limit set under Rule 23(b), the President shall immediately make
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although they should have. However, if the object and purpose of setting
up the enquiry Chamber is considered, it will be concluded that the
appropriate time limit should be very few days. This is validated by the
fact that a successful enquiry necessitates the instantaneous collection of
evidence. The importance of this is self-evident considering the
vulnerable nature of evidence, whereby it may either fade away or be
deliberately eliminated by the violator.
B. Conduct of the Enquiry
Subsequent to the composition of the Chamber of enquiry,
consistent with Article 90(3), the question of how the enquiry will be
carried out by this Chamber surfaces. At this juncture, Article 90(4)
comes into play, which reads as follows:
a) The Chamber set up under paragraph 3 to undertake an
inquiry shall invite the Parties to the conflict to assist it and
to present evidence. The Chamber may also seek such
other evidence as it deems appropriate and may carry out an
investigation of the situation in loco.
b) All evidence shall be fully disclosed to the Parties, which
shall have the right to comment on it to the Commission.
c) Each Party shall have the right to challenge such
evidence. 152
Although the very first step to be taken by the Chamber is to invite
the parties to the conflict to assist it and to present evidence, this
obligation must be understood in its proper context. Thus, it should be
regarded as a call upon the Parties to assist the Chamber and to present
the evidence they have. It does not, however, prevent the Chamber from
searching for evidence by itself without waiting for a response to this
invitation. This is confirmed by the fact that the parties are not obliged
the appointments necessary to fill the seats of the Chamber.
d) The President of the Commission shall appoint the Head of the
Chamber.
e) If a Member appointed as a member of a Chamber believes that there
are reasons disqualifying him from participating in the enquiry, he shall
immediately impart them to the President, who may appoint another
member.
Rules of the IHFFC, supra note 27, Rule 23. The above-mentioned rule gives no
guidance to the appropriate time limit. It is recommended to include a certain time limit
in the Rules of Procedure in order to avoid any disputes in this matter, as it might be
conceivable that the delay in appointing the ad hoc members in most of the cases will be
caused by the wrongdoer. Thus, it is also conceivable that this party might also challenge
the appointment of the ad hoc member by the President on the basis that they were not
given the appropriate time limit, which might result in more delay for setting up the
Chamber.
152. Protocol I, supra note 23, art. 90(4).
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to assist the Chamber or to present evidence as understood from the use
of the verb "invite." Moreover, using the verb "assist" also supports this.
However, it should be noted that the invitation to present evidence is
exclusively for the "Parties to the conflict" and not to any other party,
even if it is concerned. On the other hand, the Chamber can accept
evidence from other parties concerned. This is valid insofar that the
phrase "Parties to the conflict" is clearly related to the invitation.
Furthermore, the phrase "[t]he Chamber may also seek such other
evidence as it deems appropriate," sustains this view.
As the Chamber is not obligated to accept the veracity of the
evidence presented by the parties, it "may also seek such other evidence
as it deems appropriate and may carry out an investigation of the
situation in loco." However, the Chamber's undertaking of an in loco
investigation raises a number of questions. The first is whether or not the
parties to the conflict are obliged to permit the Chamber to carry out an
investigation in loco. Second, are the parties obliged to facilitate the
Chamber's mission while investigating in loco? Finally, what is the
international status of the members of Chamber and what are the
privileges and immunities granted to the Chamber while investigating in
loco?
Regarding the first question, if the parties to the conflict are States
that have recognized the competence of the Commission in advance,
pursuant to Article 90(2)(a), they are clearly bound by the entirety of
Article 90. Accordingly, they are obliged to permit the investigation by
the Chamber in loco. On the other hand, if the parties to the conflict
have accepted the competence of the Commission pursuant to Article
90(2)(d) without any special agreement that bars the investigation in
loco, 153 the parties are also obliged to permit the investigation in loco.
Logically, this obligation includes that of granting the Chamber entry to
their territories.
As regards the second question, it is to be noted that it is clearly
related to the obligations outlined within the framework of the above
response to the first question. However, facilitation of the Chamber's
investigation implies that, "it should be provided with all the facilities
necessary for this. Ideally it would be assisted by qualified personnel, in
the sense of Article 6 of the Protocol."1 54  Moreover, facilitation of
153. See BOTHE, supra note 49, at 545. Bothe states that "[bly recognizing the
competence of the Commission in accordance with paragraph 2(e), the State has also
recognized the right to carry out investigations in loco (para. 4 (a)). A special agreement
could exclude the right to carry out such investigations." Id.
154. SANDOZ, supra note 28, at 1049. Article 6 of the Protocol under the title of
"qualified persons" stipulates that:
1. The High Contracting Parties shall, also in peacetime, endeavour, with the
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investigation in loco implies that the Chamber's investigation should not
be obstructed. Such obstruction assumes a multitude of forms, e.g.
threatening witnesses or retaliation against them or against their relatives,
etc., all of which are banned in accordance with the obligation to act in
good faith. That obligation dictates that, "[t]he performance of treaties is
subject to an over-riding obligation of mutual good faith." 155 In essence,
it directly flows from the fundamental rule Pacta Sunt Servanda, which
states that, "treaties are binding on the parties and must be performed in
good faith," 156 a rule that has now become a part of customary
international law.
157
Surprisingly, in consideration of the third and final question, one
realizes that Article 90 failed to tackle the international status and the
protection of the members of the Chamber while carrying on
investigations. "There is no established requirement that they be granted
diplomatic status yet they should receive some form of protection while
they are conducting enquiry 'in country. ,,158 However, this problem was
assistance of the national Red Cross [Red Crescent, Red Lion and Sun]
Societies, to train qualified personnel to facilitate the application of the
Conventions and of this Protocol, and in particular the activities of the
Protecting Powers.
2. The recruitment and training of such personnel are within domestic
jurisdiction.
3. The International Committee of the Red Cross shall hold at the disposal of
the High Contracting Parties the lists of persons so trained which the High
Contracting Parties may have established and may have transmitted to it for
that purpose.
4. The conditions governing the employment of such personnel outside the
national territory shall, in each case, be the subject of special agreements
between the Parties concerned.
Protocol I, supra note 23, art. 6.
155. MCNAIR, supra note 44, at 465.
156. MENON, supra note 57, at 55.
157. Hans Wehberg, Pacta Sunt Servanda, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 775, 783 (1959).
158. Roach, supra note 40, at 177. It is useful to note that the members of fact-
finding bodies working within the United Nations system are protected by the
Convention of 1946 on the privileges and immunities of the United Nations and the
corresponding Convention relating to the specialized agencies adopted in 1947. Article
43 of the ICCPR provides the members of the Human Rights Committee and the
members of the ad hoc conciliation Commissions with privileges and immunities of the
experts on a mission for the United Nations, and it reads as follows:
The members of the Committee, and of the ad hoc conciliation Commissions which may
be appointed under article 42, shall be entitled to the facilities, privileges and immunities
of experts on mission for the United Nations as laid down in the relevant sections of the
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.
ICCPR, supra note 24, art. 43. Article VI of the Convention on the Privileges and
Immunities of the United Nations, Feb. 13, 1946, 1 U.N.T.S. 15, dealing with the
privileges and immunities of experts on missions for the United Nations, reads as
follows:
Experts on Missions for the United Nations
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dealt with in Rule 27(3) and (4) of the Rules of the IHFFC, which
provides as follows:
3. The President shall remind the interested parties that, during an
enquiry in loco, they must assure to the members of the Chamber and
all persons accompanying them the privileges and immunities
necessary for the discharge of their functions which shall not be less
extensive than those accorded to the experts on mission under the
1946 Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United
Nations, as well as their adequate protection.
SECTION 22. Experts (other than officials coming within the scope of Article
V) performing missions for the United Nations shall be accorded such
privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of their
functions during the period of their missions, including the time spent on
journeys in connection with their missions. In particular they shall be
accorded:
(a) Immunity from personal arrest or detention and from seizure of their
personal baggage;
(b) In respect of words spoken or written and acts done by them in the
course of the performance of their mission, immunity from legal process of
every kind. This immunity from legal process shall continue to be accorded
notwithstanding that the persons concerned are no longer employed on
missions for the United Nations;
(c) Inviolability for all papers and documents;
(d) For the purpose of their communications with the United Nations, the
right to use codes and to receive papers or correspondence by courier or in
sealed bags;
(e) The same facilities in respect of currency or exchange restrictions as are
accorded to representatives of foreign governments on temporary official
missions;
(f) The same immunities and facilities in respect of their personal baggage
as are accorded to diplomatic envoys.
SECTION 23. Privileges and immunities are granted to experts in the interests
of the United Nations and not for the personal benefit of the individuals
themselves. The Secretary-General shall have the right and the duty to waive
the immunity of any expert in any case where, in his opinion, the immunity
would impede the course of justice and it can be waived without prejudice to
the interests of the United Nations.
Id. Moreover, the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel,
G.A. Res. 49/59, U.N. GAOR, 49 h Sess., Supp. No. 49 at 299, U.N. Doc. A/49/49
(1994), allows, in Article 1, for the experts on missions to be subject to the provisions of
this Convention, as it reads as follows:
For the purposes of this Convention:
(a) "United Nations personnel" means:
(i) Persons engaged or deployed by the Secretary-General of the United
Nations as members of the military, police or civilian components of a
United Nations operation;
(ii) Other officials and experts on mission of the United Nations or its
specialized agencies or the International Atomic Energy Agency who are
present in an official capacity in the area where a United Nations operation
is being conducted;
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4. During an enquiry in loco, the members of the Chamber shall be
issued a document stating their capacity, as well as a white badge
displaying in clearly visible black letters the name of the Commission
in the local language.
159
The fact is that Rule 27(3) and (4) is problematic, insofar as it
commences with the phrase, "[t]he President shall remind." This gives
an impression of formerly laid down provisions or agreements, when
none exist. This paradox seems to imply that the term "shall remind,"
not be used in this context, as the investigations undertaken by the
Chambers will be in cases of "grave breaches and other serious
violations." Thus the investigations could take place during war time,
when protection of the members of the Chambers cannot be granted by
"shall remind." Accordingly, it is highly recommended that there should
be an agreement regarding the privileges and immunities to be afforded
to Chambers during investigations (including the protection of witnesses,
their relatives, etc.). This agreement should be concluded between the
parties that had accepted the compulsory competence of the Commission.
Moreover, the parties should sign a special agreement to implement the
suggested agreement in cases of ad hoc enquiries.
The rules of evidence laid down in Article 90(4)(c) and (d) tend to
confer to the Chamber's activity a quasi-judicial character.1 60 This is true
insofar that the evidence can be both commented upon and challenged.
However, it should be noted that the wording of Article 90(4)(b)
stipulates that the parties have the right to comment on the evidence to
the Commission and not to the Chamber. Meanwhile, Article 90(4)(c)
does not mention whether the evidence shall be challenged before the
Chamber or before the Commission. Nonetheless, one may logically
assume that, should the right to comment on the evidence be practiced
before the Commission, the challenging of the evidence should also be
before the Commission. This interpretation is supported by the noscitur
a sociis rule of interpretation (the meaning of an unclear word or phrase
should be determined by the words immediately surrounding it).
Disclosure of the evidence, comment upon it, and the challenging of
it is not exclusively conceded to the parties to the conflict. Thus, the use
of the term "Parties" rather than "Parties to the conflict" in Article
90(4)(b) and (c), signifies that these rights are granted to all concerned
parties. Such a statement is further supported by the following fact:
"[t]he evidence may implicate either a party to the conflict which was
not the object of the allegations made, whether or not it accepted the
159. Rules of the IHFFC, supra note 27, Rule 27.
160. SANDOZ, supra note 28, at 1050.
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compulsory competence of the Commission, or a State which is not
Party to the conflict (for example, in case of internment in... a
neutral country)." 1
6 1
Article 90 barely specifies any of the procedures to be pursued by
the Chamber, providing for the invitation of the Parties to the conflict to
assist it and to present evidence. Accordingly, it will be up to either the
Commission to establish fact-finding procedures to be followed by all
Chambers, or to each Chamber to set up its own. 16' Roach suggested that
the former is preferable "because of the urgency of getting on with each
Chamber's work and the need for uniformity and credibility of the results
of the enquiries."' 163 While this view appears persuasive, the fact is that
the investigation process is characterized by constant change. That is,
the task of the investigation is the collection of evidence that varies from
one situation to another and, within that, from one stage to the next.
161. Id.
162. Roach, supra note 40, at 179. It is worthwhile to call attention to Rules 26 and
27 of the Rules of the IHFFC. Rule 26 reads as follows: "The Commission may establish
general or specific instructions or guidelines concerning the enquiry." Rules of the
IHFFC, supra note 27, Rule 26.
Rule 27 provides some details for the procedures of the Chamber and it reads as
follows:
1. The Chamber shall invite the parties to the conflict to assist it and to present
evidence within a fixed time period. It may also seek any other evidence it
considers relevant and may carry out an enquiry in loco.
2. The Chamber shall determine the admissibility and the weight of the
evidence presented by the parties to the conflict, and the conditions under
which witnesses shall be heard.
3. The President shall remind the interested parties that, during an enquiry in
loco, they must assure to the members of the Chamber and all persons
accompanying them the privileges and immunities necessary for the discharge
of their functions which shall not be less extensive than those accorded to the
experts on mission under the 1946 Convention on Privileges and Immunities of
the United Nations, as well as their adequate protection.
4. During an enquiry in loco, the members of the Chamber shall be issued a
document stating their capacity, as well as a white badge displaying in clearly
visible black letters the name of the Commission in the local language.
5. The members of the Chamber may separate in order to conduct
simultaneous enquiries at different places. In particular, the Chamber may, at
any time, detach two or more of its members for an urgent enquiry on the spot
and, if necessary, to ensure the preservation of evidence.
6. Five members of the Chamber shall constitute a quorum.
7. The Chamber shall, as soon as possible, communicate the results of its
enquiry to the Commission in accordance with the instructions given to it.
8. All the evidence shall be fully disclosed to the parties concerned who shall
be informed of their right to comment on it to the Commission.
9. If necessary, the Commission may instruct the Chamber to undertake a
complementary enquiry.
Id. Rule 27.
163. Roach, supra note 40, at 179.
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Thus, the investigations often have to deal with innumerable situations
that vary due to infinite factors. Accordingly, if it is imperative to lay
down the Chamber's procedures, such procedures need be sufficiently
flexible to enable the Chambers to accomplish their tasks effectively.
Apparently, this was the route that ensued in the Rules of Procedure of
the IHFFC.
Ultimately, attention shall be called to Rule 21(6) of the Rules of
the IHFFC, which deals with the withdrawal of the request by the
requesting party, in the course of an enquiry. The effect of this
withdrawal is that the Chamber shall only cease its enquiry upon the
consent of the other parties to the conflict.
5. Report of the Commission
After the Chamber's mission concludes, and the investigation
process is terminated, a report including the Chamber's findings of facts
is issued. Article 90(5)(a) provides the following: "The Commission
shall submit to the Parties a report on the findings of fact of the
Chamber, with such recommendations as it may deem appropriate.""
Article 90(5)(a)1 65 does not stipulate whether it is the Commission
or the Chamber who should prepare the report, but only that the
submission of it is to be by the Commission. Nevertheless, if Article
90(5)(a) is read in tandem with Article 90(4)(b) and (c) (commenting on
the evidence and challenging it before the Commission), one deduces
that preparation of the report is the Commission's responsibility.
Furthermore, Rule 28 of the Rules of the IHFFC clarifies that the
Commission is in charge of drawing up the report. 166 According to Rule
164. Protocol I, supra note 23, Article 90(5)(a).
165. It was noted in ICRC commentary that the wording of Article 90(5)(a) is similar
to the wording of Article 13(1) of the CEFRD, which reads as follows:
When the Commission has fully considered the matter, it shall prepare and
submit to the Chairman of the Committee a report embodying its findings on all
questions of fact relevant to the issue between the parties and containing such
recommendations as it may think proper for amicable solution of the dispute.
CEFRD, supra note 26, art. 13(1). The ICRC commentary then stated that "[t]he
similarity to the present sub-paragraph is striking, and it is therefore no longer merely a
question of good offices, as in paragraph 2(c)(ii). This may be interpreted as a first step
towards mediation." SANDOZ, supra note 28, at 1050.
166. Under the title of "Preparation of the Commission's Report," Rule 28 of the
Rules of Procedure of the IHFFC provides as follows:
1. After each enquiry the Commission shall draw up, in the light of the
Chamber's findings, a report to be transmitted to the parties concerned. In
particular, the Commission shall consider, as appropriate, whether it should
take steps to facilitate, through its good offices, the restoration of an attitude of
respect for the Geneva Conventions and the Protocol.
2. The President shall transmit the report together with any recommendations
the Commission considers appropriate to the parties concerned.
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27(7), the Chamber's report should be submitted to the Commission as a
whole and not to the President. 167
The report shall be submitted not only to the parties to the conflict,
but to all the parties, with such recommendations that might be deemed
appropriate. The Commission, and not the Chambers, shall make the
recommendations, since the Commission is in charge of preparing the
report as aforementioned. This is underscored in Rule 28(2) of the Rules
of the IHFFC. However, it might be suggested that the Chambers may
submit to the Commission its recommendations, and its
recommendations shall be considered by the Commission, given that, the
Chamber's recommendations will be insightful and based on a realistic
and factual view. This will assist the Commission to submit to the
parties the appropriate recommendations.
Article 90(5)(b) reads as follows: "If the Chamber is unable to
secure sufficient evidence for factual and impartial findings, the
Commission shall state the reasons for that inability., 168 This case might
be necessary "if the parties to the conflict do not respond properly to the
Chamber's invitation to assist it and to present evidence."' 169 In stating
that the "Commission shall state the reasons for that," Article 90(5)(b)
implies that the Commission shall make this statement publicly. That is,
it aims to make it clear to the international community that a party or the
parties to the conflict were not reliable when they accepted the
Commission's competence, or they were unwilling to assist the Chamber
and acted in bad faith. The statement of the Commission might exert
ethical pressure upon the parties, and discomfit them before the
international community.
Logically, if the Commission is to state the reasons for the inability
to secure evidence for factual and impartial findings, there needs be a
previously fixed time limit for the assistance of the parties to the conflict
3. The President shall have the date on which the Commission's report was sent
to the interested parties duly registered. The Secretariat shall keep in its
archives copies of the communications of the Chambers and the reports of the
Commission in its custody. These records are accessible only to Members
while in office.
Rules of the IHFFC, supra note 27, Rule 28.
167. It should be noted that the Chamber would certainly communicate the results,
including its findings of fact to the Commission. It was suggested by Mr. Roach that the
Chamber's report is recommended for submission to the President and not to the
Commission as whole. Concerning this suggestion, and from a personal viewpoint, it
might seem more appropriate that the Chamber's report should be submitted to the
Commission as whole and not to the President. This holds true, since, according to
Article 90(5)(a), the Commission as whole, and not the President solely, is responsible
for the preparation of the report. See Roach, supra note 40, at 167.
168. Protocol I, supra note 23, art. 90(5)(b).
169. Kussbach, supra note 33, at 179.
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and also for presentation of their evidence. In other words, the "question
of the period of time is of great importance as it determines the moment
when the Commission will have to expose publicly the responsibility of
the Parties concerned, by publicly reporting their shortcomings, if
any.5 170  Surprisingly, Article 90 does not provide such a deadline. 17
However, Rule 27(1) of the Rules of the IHFFC provides that, "[t]he
chamber shall invite... within a fixed time period."'' 72
Article 90(5)(c) provides that "[t]he Commission shall not report its
findings publicly, unless all the Parties to the conflict have requested the
Commission to do SO.'173 Obviously, the wording of Article 90(5)(c)
debars the Commission from publishing its report, unless it is requested
to do so by all the parties to the conflict. This issue was widely
controversial during the preparatory work. 174
170. SANDOZ, supra note 28, at 1050.
171. It was noted in the ICRC commentary that "unlike the corresponding provisions
of the conventions on human rights, this sub-paragraph does not determine the period
within which the State accused of violation has to reply to the Chamber's requests." The
commentary here was pointing towards Article 41(1)(a) of the ICCPR, which reads as
follows:
If a State Party to the present Covenant considers that another State Party is not
giving effect to the provisions of the present Covenant, it may by written
communication, bring the matter to the attention of that State Party. Within
three months after receipt of the communication, the receiving State shall
afford the State which sent the communication an explanation or any other
statement in writing clarifying the matter, which should include, to the extent
possible and pertinent, reference to domestic remedies taken, pending, or
available in the matter.
ICCPR, supra note 24, art. 41(1)(a). The ICRC commentary also pointed to Article 11(1)
of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, which
provides as follows:
If a State Party considers that another State Party is not giving effect to the
provisions of this Convention, it may bring the matter to the attention of the
Committee. The Committee shall then transmit the communication to the State
Party concerned. Within three months, the receiving State shall submit to the
Committee written explanations or statements clarifying the matter and the
remedy, if any, that may have been taken by that State.
CEFRD, supra note 26, art. 44(l)(a). However, it seems that the abovementioned articles
are mentioned by the commentary only to show the importance of the time limit in those
situations, but the time period stipulated in them does not fit, either with perceived
consequences of the situations in an armed conflict or with Chamber's tasks, as they are
too long. The Chamber's deadline should be less than that.
172. Rules of the IHFFC, supra note 27, Rule 21(1).
173. Protocol I, supra note 23, art. 90(5)(c).
174. The delegates were divided on the issue of publishing the Commission's report.
Three views were illustrated during the preparatory work; the first was the delegates who
preferred that the report be made public. The delegate of the Syrian Arab Republic voted
against Article 90, and one of the reasons for this vote was Article 90(5)(c). He stated
that "paragraph 5(c), under which publication of the Commission's report depends on the
wishes and request of all parties to the conflict ... publication of the findings-the only
sanction open to the enquiry--can thus be prevented by the Party found to have
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Although Article 90(5)(c) explicitly bars the Commission from
publishing its report, this prohibition is not extended to the parties to the
conflict or the parties concerned, as nothing in Article 90 bans this.
However, it might be argued that, since the Commission is debarred from
publishing its report, the parties to the conflict should be bound by this
obligation. This could hold true, since the aim of this obligation is to
bestow the advantages of discreet diplomacy.
On the other hand, it might be counter argued that nothing in the
wording of Article 90(5)(c) indicates that the obligation not to publish
the report is extended to the Parties to the conflict. This is what the plain
terms and natural meaning of the Article 90(5)(c) imply. This meaning
was expressed in 1925 by the Permanent Court of International Justice,
in its advisory opinion upon the Exchange of Greek and Turkish
Populations, wherein the Court had to determine the meaning of the
word "etablis," stating:
Nor is there any indication that the authors of the Convention, when
they adopted the word that has given rise to the present controversy,
had in mind national legislation at all. Everything therefore seems to
indicate that, in regard to this point, the Convention itself-contained
and the mixed Commission [the body charged with the supervision of
the exchange] in order to decide what constitutes an established
committed a breach." He concluded saying that "to deprive the Commission of its right
automatically to publish its report is to deprive the enquiry procedure of one of its most
effective means of pressure." This might hold true in view of the fact that the party who
is found in breach will be "able to avoid public control and exposure and is free to
continue to violate the provisions of the Conventions and the Protocol." Official
Records, supra note 21, at 384.
The second view was of those who did not favor the publicity of the report of the
Commission. The delegate of Switzerland, expressing this view, stated that "such
publicity was completely contrary to the spirit of humanitarian law, since it could only
furnish material for propaganda and false accusations from each side, without being help
to the victims to be protected. On the contrary, discreet diplomacy was called for."
Moreover, the German Democratic Republic delegates stated that, "were the Commission
to make its findings public, the facts might be distorted by the world's leading
information organ, given the political opinions held by most of them." Id. at 214.
The third view, which was an intermediate solution, was illustrated in the statement
of the Japanese delegate. He stated that, "[w]ith respect to the publicity to be given to the
findings of an enquiry, he thought that the president of the Commission and the Chamber
must be left free to decide on the question, in consultation with the parties." Similarly,
the delegate of New Zealand expressed the view that "while recognizing the Swiss
representative's point about the advantages of discreet diplomacy, the co-sponsors felt
that it might be necessary, in extreme cases, to appeal to the bar of public opinion." He
added that, "there was no reason why there should not be a provision that the chamber
could give the parties time for reflection before publicly reporting its findings."
Moreover, he noted that "the present text contained some flexibility since the parties
could agree... not to have the report published, and the chamber would have a wide
discretion in the way it drafted its report." Id. at 231-232.
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inhabitant must rely on the natural meaning of the words."' 175
Furthermore, in its advisory opinion upon the interpretation of
Article 3(2) of the Treaty of Lausanne (the Mosul frontier between Iraq
and Turkey), the Permanent Court of International Justice has stated that,
"if the wording of a treaty provision is not clear, in choosing between
several admissible interpretations, the one which involves the minimum
of obligations for the Parties should be adopted."'
7 6
Thus, one deduces that Article 90 does not debar the parties from
publishing the Commission's report. In this context, the following
question imposes itself: Given the hypothetical situation of one of the
parties publishing the Commission's report after receiving it, but the said
report contained incorrect or misleading findings, it is utterly conceivable
that the other party or parties might do the same. This will produce two
controversial reports, both of which might be false. Will the
Commission be freed from the obligation not to publish its report?
One can argue that the Commission should not publish its report,
even if in response to faulty ones published by a party or the parties to
the conflict. This is because the Commission is bound by the clear
wording of Article 90(5)(c). Additionally, Article 90 does not bar a party
or the parties from publishing the report and does not lay down any
consequences if this situation occurs.
On the other hand it can be counter argued that, within the
boundaries of morality, this obligation shall cease to continue.
Moreover, the intention of the drafters was clear on the issue of why they
imposed such an obligation on the Commission. The drafters' intention
was expressed in the speech of the delegate of Switzerland who stated
that, "such publicity was completely contrary to the spirit of
humanitarian law, since it could only furnish material for propaganda
and false accusations from each side, without being help to the victims to
be protected. On the contrary, discreet diplomacy was called for.5177
Accordingly, if there were pre-existing false accusations, discreet
diplomacy is utterly ineffective. As such, the rationale for the obligation
is undermined and no longer exists. Within such parameters, the
Commission can, and should, publish its report.
6. The Commission's Own Rules
Article 90(6) stipulates that:
175. Advisory Opinion No. 10, Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, 1925
P.C.I.J. (ser. B)No. 10, at 20-26 (Feb. 21).
176. Advisory Opinion No. 12, The Interpretation of Article 3(2) of the Treaty of
Lausanne, 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 12, at 6-25 (Nov. 21).
177. Official Records, supra note 21, at 214.
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The Commission shall establish its own rules, including rules for the
presidency of the Commission and the presidency of the Chamber.
Those rules shall ensure that the functions of the President of the
Commission are exercised at all times and that, in the case of an
inquiry, a person who is not a national of a Party to the conflict
exercises them. 1
78
The aforementioned paragraph emphasizes that the rules to be
adopted need to respect the conditions laid down in the present paragraph
and in the article as a whole, and takes into account the requirements
inherent in situations of armed conflict. 1
79
On July 8, 1992, the Rules of the International Humanitarian Fact-
Finding Commission were adopted. These rules comprise five parts,
encompassing forty rules dealing with the organization of the
Commission, the working of the Commission, enquiries, the methods of
work, and amendments and suspension.' 80
Recognizing the central role of the President, the continuity of
his/her function is explicitly referred to.' 8' This role is one that, in
reality, the President of the Commission has probably never played, as it
appears that neither the President nor the members of the Commission or
even the Commission itself exists on the map of the international
community as a permanent humanitarian fact finding body.
The present paragraph emphasizes that the President of the
Commission shall be replaced if his/her State is a party to a conflict
submitted to the Commission to investigate it. This replacement shall
take place in case of an enquiry. On the other hand, if the Commission is
offering or performing its good offices, nothing in Article 90 asserts that
the President shall be replaced. It might be helpful if the State of the
President of the Commission is a party to a conflict and the Commission
is offering its good offices in this situation. However, it should be noted
that should the other party or any of the parties to the conflict raise
objections regarding this issue, the President should be replaced.
7. Expenses and Funding of the Commission
Differentiating between two categories of expenses, Article 90(7)
provides as follows:
The administrative expenses of the Commission shall be met by
contributions from the High Contracting Parties which made
declarations under paragraph 2, and by voluntary contributions. The
178. Protocol I, supra note 23, art. 90(6).
179. SANDOZ, supra note 28, at 1051.
180. Rules of the IHFFC, supra note 27.
181. Id.
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Party or Parties to the conflict requesting an inquiry shall advance the
necessary funds for expenses incurred by a Chamber and shall be
reimbursed by the Party or Parties against which the allegations are
made to the extent of fifty percent of the costs of the Chamber.
Where there are counter-allegations before the Chamber each side
shall advance fifty percent of the necessary funds.
182
The first type of expense is the administrative expenses of the
Commission. These shall be met by contributions from the States that
have recognized the compulsory competence of the Commission
pursuant to Article 90(2)(a), and by voluntary contributions. It was
argued that this obligation might discourage States from accepting the
compulsory competence of the Commission.'
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The second type is the expenses of the enquiry Chambers, which
must be provided by the parties to the conflict. In other words, they are
to be provided by those who are using the services of the Chambers:
"The requesting State has to advance the necessary funds and is
reimbursed by the adverse Party to the extent of fifty percent,
irrespective of whether his allegations were true or not., 184  This
procedure is also subject to criticism, as it is not plausible that a State
involved in an armed conflict will direct a part of its finance to enquiry,
while it has other obligations and more important issues to be financed.
However, it might be suggested that the Commission should declare that
the expenses of the Chamber would be a nominal amount or it can offer
its services free, but this is subject to the financial ability of the
Commission.
Conotusion
As illustrated in this article, Article 90 of Protocol I is a complex
provision, which gives rise to many interesting questions. The most
basic point to be made about this provision is that, while it was intended
to provide a permanent enquiry mechanism, it ended up as a provision
devoid of practical use. This resulted from the heavy machinery that is
necessary for the enquiry procedure to be instigated and to function.
Despite such heavy machinery provided in this provision, hope for the
resuscitation of Article 90 remains. The basic motivating ideas behind
the inclusion of Article 90 were elucidated through a detailed discussion
of the drafting history of Article 90. Additionally, several suggestions
based on the interpretation of Article 90 were offered.
The first suggestion concerns the nomination and the election of the
182. Protocol I, supra note 23, art. 90(7).
183. BOTHE, supra note 49, at 546.
184. Id.
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members of the Commission. As the Commission might be called upon
to enquire or perform good offices in a conflict in which a non-State
party is involved, it is more equitable not to restrict nomination of
members to the parties to the Protocol.
The second suggestion relates to a situation wherein a State that has
not recognized the compulsory competence of the Commission requests
an enquiry. It does so alleging that a State that has recognized the
compulsory competence of the Commission committed a grave breach or
a serious violation. As illustrated above, a literal reading of Article 90
and the ICRC commentary would lead to the introduction of an element
of inequality. The suggestion that an agreement can be made between
the two States to grant equality and the inclusion of this in the Rules of
Procedure of the Commission will broaden the competence of the
Commission. Moreover, it will bring Article 90(2)(a) within the
framework of the objectives of the Geneva Conventions and Protocols
and the norms of the humanitarian law.
The issue of the acceptance of the Commission's compulsory
competence according to Article 90(2)(a) and whether or not it can be
made with reservations was discussed. It was established that
reservations are not allowed. In discussing the Commission's area of
competence, it was concluded that the term "serious violations" can be
interpreted broadly to include both grave breaches and other violations of
a serious nature. It was further suggested that the Commission needs to
clarify the exact connotation of the term "serious violations." This, in
fact, is imperative insofar as it concerns the Commission's area of
competence. Vagueness, ambiguity, or lack of definition concerning
terms related to the area of competence of the Commission tould
function to discourage States from acceptance of the Commission's
competence.
The argument emphasized that, irrespective of any request, the
Commission should offer its good offices. Moreover, the offering and'
performance of good offices should not be confined to the parties to the
Protocol and the Conventions. The article further argued (contrary to the
viewpoint of one author) that the offering and performance of good
offices not be limited to serious violations. That is, it is imperative that
these good offices be offered and performed in instances of minor
violations, noting that these ultimately can lead to more serious
violations.
The Chamber of enquiry, its composition and how the enquiry
should be conducted was considered in section 4. It was suggested that
the Chambers of enquiry should embrace members from the neutral
surrounding countries to the conflict, or from the same civilization and
legal system. This is simply because it is indispensable to take the
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diverse cultures of the parties to the conflict and their national legal
systems into account, since they are consistent with the relevant
international standards. More to that point, it was suggested that the two
ad hoc members who are to be elected by the parties to the conflict
should have the same qualifications as the members of the Commission
(acknowledged impartiality and high moral standings). Additionally, it
was recommended that an agreement granting the members of the
Chambers the suitable immunities and privileges should be concluded.
Section 5 dealt with the different aspects regarding the report of the
Commission, involving the situation if the parties published the report of
the Commission that included false or misleading information. In this
situation, it was suggested that the imposed obligation on the
Commission that bars it from publishing the report should cease to
continue.
The above proposals can only operate efficiently if the Commission
increases its activity level in the international forum. In doing so, the
Commission should convene conferences that aim to clarify its
competency and the benefits to be gained from its acceptance. This
could possibly convince more and more countries to accept the
Commission's competency. However, if the Commission's members
refuse to recognize its current impotency and are satisfied with the status
quo, mummification will prevail. In such an instance, the Commission
will become the dead letter predicted by the Syrian delegate in the 1977
Diplomatic Conference.
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